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ABSTRACT—Within the past several years, the U.S. Department of Justice
has pledged to prosecute asylum-seekers who enter the United States outside
an official port of entry without inspection. This practice has contributed to
mass incarceration and family separation at the U.S.–Mexico border, and it
has prevented bona fide refugees from accessing relief in immigration court.
Yet, federal judges have taken refugee prosecution in stride, assuming that
refugees, like other foreign migrants, are subject to the full force of American
criminal justice if they skirt domestic border controls. This assumption is
gravely mistaken.
This Article shows that Congress has not authorized courts to punish
refugees for illegal entry or reentry. While largely taken for granted today,
the idea that refugees may be prosecuted for such acts is in tension with the
full text, context, and purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is
also inconsistent with traditional canons of statutory interpretation, such as
the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on constitutional avoidance, and the
rule of lenity. Therefore, federal prosecutors should abandon refugee
prosecution, and federal courts should hold that the criminal prohibitions on
illegal entry and reentry do not apply to refugees.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2017, a Kafkaesque scene unfolded at the federal
courthouse in El Paso, Texas. Three women from El Salvador who had
traveled over two thousand miles in search of asylum found themselves
facing criminal illegal entry charges in an American courtroom.1 With tears
in their eyes, they begged their public defender to contest the charges on the
ground that they were asylum-seekers2 fleeing persecution, only to be told
that the exercise would be futile and counterproductive. The fact that they
might be legally entitled to enter and live in the United States as refugees did
not necessarily preclude their prosecution for illegal entry. Moreover,
fighting the charges would likely only increase the amount of time they
would spend in jail, their attorney explained. Visibly bewildered, but relying
on the advice of counsel, all three pleaded guilty. The presiding magistrate
1

See HUM. RTS. FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S
MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 9 (2018) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST],
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-Punishing-Refugees-Migrants.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2WG-SV69] (recounting court observation of Magistrate Judge Leon Schydlower,
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso, Texas, September 7, 2017). For economy’s
sake, I have omitted one defendant, a male asylum-seeker from Nicaragua, from this anecdote.
2
An “asylum-seeker” is a foreign national at or within the United States’ borders who seeks legal
recognition as a refugee.
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judge expressed sympathy for their position, lamenting, “[N]one of you are
criminals.”3 Then, he proceeded to convict and sentence all three women.4
Sadly, this episode is no aberration. Within the past several years, both
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) have declared that asylum-seekers will receive “zero
tolerance” if they enter the United States without inspection.5 This policy has
led to the systematic prosecution of asylum-seekers at courthouses along the
U.S.–Mexico border.6 Prosecutors have charged asylum-seekers with illegal
entry7 and reentry,8 even in cases where the defendants, as bona fide refugees,
were legally entitled to receive safe haven in the United States.9
To be sure, not every migrant who enters the United States without
inspection qualifies as a refugee. Most migrants who cross the U.S.–Mexico
border outside a port of entry never request asylum.10 Among the subset of
irregular migrants11 who do seek asylum, many are not legally entitled to
protection in the United States as bona fide refugees. To qualify as

3

HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9.
Id.
5
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal
Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Zero-Tolerance], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorneygeneral-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/R8GE-UT49].
6
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9–16 (documenting cases).
7
See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (imposing criminal sanctions against “[a]ny alien who . . . enters or attempts
to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers,” “eludes
examination or inspection by immigration officers,” and “attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United
States by a willfully false or misleading misrepresentation or the willful concealment of a material fact”).
8
See id. § 1326 (prohibiting “any alien” from “enter[ing], attempt[ing] to enter, or [being] at any
time found in, the United States” if an alien “has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed
or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding . . .
unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain [the Attorney General’s] advance
consent [to reapply for admission]”); Immigration Prosecutions for June 2019, TRAC REPS. (Aug. 9,
2019)
[hereinafter
TRAC],
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/
immigration/monthlyjun19/fil/ [https://perma.cc/3U23-UA6B] (observing that illegal entry and reentry
make up the vast majority of immigration prosecutions).
9
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (providing that refugees qualify for withholding of removal
irrespective of their immigration status and regardless of whether they are at a designated port of arrival).
10
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., EFFORTS BY DHS TO ESTIMATE
SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 16–17 (2017) [hereinafter DHS STATISTICS]
(observing that roughly one-third of arriving migrants are “minors, family units, Cubans, and individuals
who request asylum”).
11
Throughout this Article, I employ the terms “irregular entry” and “irregular migrants” to capture
the phenomenon of foreign nationals entering the United States without inspection outside an official port
of entry. I use this neutral terminology, rather than “illegal entry” and “illegal entrants,” to avoid
prejudging whether particular migrants have entered the United States illegally. The thesis of this Article,
after all, is that U.S. law does not prohibit bona fide refugees from entering the United States without
inspection outside an official port of entry.
4
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“refugees” under domestic and international law, asylum-seekers must
demonstrate that they have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” in their
country of origin based on their “race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”12 Most asylum-seekers do not
satisfy these criteria.13
Nonetheless, this does not mean that refugee prosecution is a rare
phenomenon in the United States. The federal government prosecutes tens
of thousands of migrants for illegal entry and reentry every year—including
over 100,000 in the 2019 fiscal year alone.14 If a third of these irregular
migrants are asylum-seekers, and if 20% of those asylum-seekers are bona
fide refugees, as then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen
estimated in May 2018,15 it would still follow that thousands of refugees have
served time for illegal entry or reentry within the past several years.
Prosecuting refugees in this manner violates the United States’
obligations under international law. Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)
declares that governments

12

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(defining a “refugee” principally as a “person who . . . is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion”). International policymakers sometimes reserve the term “refugee” for
migrants who have already had their legally protected status confirmed by domestic authorities or an
international organization. See Asylum-Seekers, UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/asylum-seekers.html [https://perma.cc/H7QL-MQG4]. For purposes of this
Article, however, I follow the usage of the INA and the Refugee Convention, which define “refugee”
objectively without regard to whether authorities have recognized this status. See UNHCR, A GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS 18 (2017),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d4aba564/refugee-protection-guide-internationalrefugee-law-handbook-parliamentarians.html [https://perma.cc/JKL9-AKAP] (“A person is a refugee as
soon as the criteria contained in this [legal] definition are fulfilled. In other words, a person does not
become a refugee because of a positive decision on an application for protection. Recognition of refugee
status is declaratory: it confirms that the person is indeed a refugee.”).
13
See Anna Giaritelli, 80 Percent of Asylum Cases at Southwest Border Aren’t Legitimate, DHS
Chief Says, WASH. EXAM’R (May 16, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tag/foxnews?source=%2Fnews%2F80-percent-of-asylum-cases-at-southwest-border-arent-legitimate-dhschief-says [https://perma.cc/48G8-ZYUG].
14
In fiscal year 2019, federal prosecutors charged 80,866 defendants with illegal entry and 25,426
defendants with illegal reentry. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Prosecuted a RecordBreaking Number of Immigration-Related Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-prosecuted-record-breaking-number-immigrationrelated-cases-fiscal-year [https://perma.cc/N9V9-NWAN].
15
Giaritelli, supra note 13.
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shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was
threatened . . . , enter or are present in their territory without authorization,
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.16

Although the United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention, it
agreed to be bound by Article 31 when it acceded to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol).17 Thus, by
prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry, the United States has
exposed itself to international censure.
Conventional wisdom suggests, however, that the Refugee Convention
and Protocol do not pose an obstacle to refugee prosecution in domestic
courts. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)18 does not expressly
grant refugees immunity from criminal liability for entering U.S. territory
without inspection. And because federal courts have determined that the
Refugee Protocol is a non-self-executing treaty,19 they have concluded that
refugees cannot rely on Article 31 as a defense to prosecution.20 Prosecutors
therefore assume that refugees who enter the United States outside an official
port of entry are subject to the full force of American criminal justice.21
Judges, in turn, routinely convict and sentence refugees for immigration
crimes, even as they occasionally express moral qualms about the practice.22

16

Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 31(1).
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 268 (1968) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. States–parties to the Refugee Protocol
“undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees.” Id. art. I(1). A key difference
between the two treaties is that the Refugee Protocol eliminates certain temporal and geographic
restrictions in the Refugee Convention’s “refugee” definition. Id. art. I(2).
18
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 229.
19
See, e.g., Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 428–29 n.22 (1984)). A non-self-executing treaty does not generate judicially enforceable legal
claims or defenses. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05, 505 n.2 (2008).
20
See, e.g., United States v. Malenge, 294 F. App’x 642, 644 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument
that prosecution for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543, 1544, and 1546 violated the Refugee Protocol
because the Protocol “is not a self-executing treaty” and therefore does “not provide [a refugee] with any
judicially enforceable rights”); United States v. Velasquez-Luna, No. 18-mj-11463-WQH, 2019 WL
338947, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (“The Protocol does not confer judicially enforceable rights that
preclude . . . prosecution under [§ 1325(a)] for eluding inspection and examination.”).
21
See Natasha Arnpriester, Trumping Asylum: Criminal Prosecutions for “Illegal” Entry and
Reentry Violate the Rights of Asylum-Seekers, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 16 (2017).
22
See Malenge, 294 F. App’x at 644–45 (characterizing refugee prosecution as “troubling” and
urging that “[t]here is surely a more appropriate way to handle such cases, and to deter such conduct,
short of criminal prosecution”).
17
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This Article challenges the prevailing assumption that U.S. law permits
the federal government to prosecute refugees. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the INA’s provisions establishing criminal penalties for illegal
entry and reentry do not apply to refugees. The idea that refugees may be
held criminally liable for such acts, while largely taken for granted today, is
inconsistent with Congress’s statutory plan for refugee protection. Congress
has never authorized the federal government to prosecute and convict
refugees for illegal entry or reentry.
Part I of this Article traces the twisting path that has led the United
States to prosecute refugees for immigration crimes. Congress has used
criminal penalties to buttress civil and administrative immigration controls
on unauthorized entry since the 1920s.23 When Congress began to make
special allowance for the protection of refugees after World War II, it
conceptualized criminal immigration law and refugee law as separate
regulatory regimes.24 Congress’s concern for refugees culminated in the
Refugee Act of 1980, which established a legal right to safe haven for nearly
all refugees who reach the United States.25 A core purpose of the Refugee
Act was to ensure that federal immigration law complied fully with the
United States’ commitments under the Refugee Protocol, and members of
Congress vigorously debated what steps would be necessary to accomplish
this objective. Yet, there is no evidence in the legislative record that either
the Executive Branch or Congress contemplated the possibility that the
INA’s criminal provisions might be out of step with Article 31. Indeed, based
on an exhaustive review of the relevant legislative history—from the INA’s
passage in 1952 through its numerous amendments over the past sixty-eight
years—this Article demonstrates that members of Congress have never
endorsed punishing refugees for illegal entry or reentry on the public record.
To the contrary, on the rare occasions when the topic has arisen in
congressional debates, legislators have rejected proposals to introduce civil
or criminal penalties into the statutory regime for refugee protection.26

23

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
25
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if
the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because
of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”).
Consistent with the Refugee Convention, the INA now carves out exceptions from withholding of
removal for, inter alia, persecutors, those who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes abroad or
particularly serious crimes in the United States, and refugees who pose threats to U.S. national security.
See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
26
See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
24
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Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, the federal government
began to blur the line between ordinary immigration enforcement and
refugee protection.27 As national authorities reconceptualized border
enforcement primarily as a national-security issue, DOJ focused more
resources on prosecuting immigration crimes, causing illegal entry and
reentry convictions to skyrocket. In response, critics at the time complained
that DHS, in its zeal to prevent terrorists and criminals from entering the
United States, was failing to screen undocumented migrants properly to
prevent the inadvertent prosecution of refugees.
What started as an incidental byproduct of the United States’ “War on
Terror” eventually cemented into official agency policy.28 In 2014, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) promulgated formal guidance that
refugees were appropriate candidates for prosecution.29 Four years later,
Attorney General Jefferson Sessions announced that federal prosecutors
would be required to prosecute all undocumented foreign migrants
apprehended at the U.S.–Mexico border, irrespective of whether the migrants
were refugees with valid claims to relief in immigration court.30 As a result,
the Executive Branch is currently committed to prosecuting refugees for
illegal entry and reentry.
Part II delivers this Article’s most important contribution by explaining
why prosecuting refugees violates federal law. In the past, federal judges
have assumed that the INA’s criminal prohibitions on illegal entry and
reentry apply fully to refugees because these provisions do not expressly
exempt refugees from criminal liability. This superficial analysis is gravely
mistaken. As the Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts, the fact
that an INA provision does not expressly articulate an exception is not a
sufficient basis to rule out that such an exception exists.31 This interpretive
27

See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
29
See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-15-95, STREAMLINE:
MEASURING ITS EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING 17 (May 15, 2015) [hereinafter INSPECTOR
GENERAL], https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-95_May15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5JCW-43XC].
30
See Zero-Tolerance, supra note 5; Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to Fed. Prosecutors Along
the Sw. Border (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1049751/download
[https://perma.cc/7VRN-L9KA] (discussing the “Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)”
policy).
31
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514–20 (2009) (holding that a provision of the INA,
which denies asylum and withholding removal to “any person” who has contributed to others’
persecution, does not unambiguously foreclose a duress exception); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,
548 U.S. 30, 35 n.4 (2006) (concluding that a provision of the INA, which prohibits refugees from
receiving “any relief” if they illegally reentered the United States, did not disqualify refugees from
receiving withholding of removal).
28
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principle is particularly salient when the whole text, context, and purpose of
the INA indicate that exempting refugees from criminal liability is an
implicit feature of the statute’s overarching legislative design. At a
minimum, the fact that Congress does not appear to have anticipated criminal
penalties applying to refugees should counsel caution before courts attribute
such a meaning to the INA. Instead, courts should bring their entire
methodological toolbox to bear on the problem, including traditional canons
of federal statutory interpretation.
Three venerable canons of statutory interpretation confirm that refugees
are exempt from prosecution for garden-variety immigration crimes. First,
the Charming Betsy canon advises courts to avoid interpreting the INA in a
manner that would undermine the United States’ international obligations.32
Remarkably, although federal courts have recognized that prosecuting
refugees violates the United States’ obligations under the Refugee Protocol,
they have never addressed whether the INA could be interpreted in such a
manner as to eliminate these conflicts, as Charming Betsy prescribes.33 This
oversight is regrettable. Applying Charming Betsy to exempt refugees from
prosecution for illegal entry and reentry would further the Refugee Act’s
raison d’être: eliminating discrepancies between U.S. refugee law and
international law.34 It would also advance Charming Betsy’s primary
purposes: minimizing the potential for friction with foreign powers35 and
ensuring that the President and Congress take the lead in deciding delicate
questions about the United States’ compliance with international law.36
Second, courts should recognize that interpreting the INA to authorize
refugee prosecution violates the U.S. Constitution. In Robinson v.
32
See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (counseling that “an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains”).
33
A few scholars have observed that the Charming Betsy canon offers a possible legal basis for
challenging refugee prosecution, but they have not grounded this claim in a sufficiently rigorous study of
the INA’s text and legislative history. See Arnpriester, supra note 21, at 41; Thomas M. McDonnell &
Vanessa H. Merton, Enter at Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum-Seekers, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 94–97 (2019). This Article supplies the missing textual and historical analysis to show why this
claim is persuasive.
34
See infra notes 204–209 and accompanying text.
35
See Serra v. Lapin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he purpose of the Charming Betsy
canon is to avoid the negative ‘foreign policy implications’ of violating the law of nations.” (quoting
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982))).
36
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 525 (1997) (emphasizing how the canon
operates “as a means of both respecting the formal constitutional roles of Congress and the President and
preserving a proper balance and harmonious working relationship among the three branches of the federal
government”).
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California,37 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” does not permit the
government to punish people based solely on narcotics addiction—a
circumstance over which they presently have no control.38 Lower courts have
extended Robinson to other circumstances where an individual’s acts are
inextricably linked to a status they cannot control. For example, they have
held that states may not punish homeless people for sleeping in public
without providing alternative accommodations where homeless people may
spend the night.39 Another logical application of the Eighth Amendment, I
argue, is that it enjoins the federal government from punishing refugees—
“the world’s homeless people”40—for illegal entry and reentry when they
lack adequate protection for their human rights abroad. As applied to
refugees, criminal penalties for illegal entry and reentry violate Robinson
because they punish acts that are inextricably linked to refugee status. The
DOJ’s zero-tolerance policy is therefore unconstitutional as applied to
refugees. Ultimately, however, federal courts need not reach the merits of
this novel constitutional question: under the canon of constitutional
avoidance, the mere fact that refugee prosecution raises grave constitutional
concerns is reason enough to construe the INA’s criminal provisions to
exempt refugees.41
Third, the rule of lenity militates against reading the INA to authorize
refugee prosecution. When “reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s
intended scope even after resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative
history, and motivating policies’ of the statute,” the rule of lenity dictates
that courts must decide the interpretive question in favor of a criminal
defendant.42 Applying the rule of lenity makes good sense in this context
because it would advance the rule’s core purposes by safeguarding
legislative supremacy,43 promoting legislative accountability,44 and
constraining prosecutorial discretion to “minimize the risk of selective or
37

370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Id. at 666–67.
39
See, e.g., Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for
homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (mem.) (2019).
40
Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971).
41
See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
42
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S.
381, 387 (1980)).
43
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (justifying lenity based on the principle that
“legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity”).
44
See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887 (2004)
(emphasizing “lenity’s role in advancing the democratic accountability of criminal justice”).
38
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arbitrary enforcement.”45 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the rule of lenity merits special force in the immigration context in light of
the fact that foreign nationals “cannot vote” in federal elections and therefore
are “particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.”46
Part III assesses whether prosecuting refugees is morally defensible.
Drawing on foundational principles from the philosophy of criminal law, I
argue that refugees often have compelling moral justifications and excuses
for violating domestic immigration controls in order to escape persecution
abroad. Due to the exigent circumstances that necessitate their flight from
persecution, refugees routinely lack passports, visas, and other documents
that would confirm their identity and enable international travel through
legally authorized channels. Indeed, the more desperate a refugee’s
circumstances, the less likely it is that she will be able to escape her own
country without violating other countries’ immigration controls. Refugees
cannot reasonably be blamed, therefore, for entering the United States
without authorization in order to avoid death, torture, or other serious harm.
Measures taken by the Trump Administration between 2017 and 2019
further strengthen the argument that prosecuting refugees is morally
indefensible.47 As the White House slashed the number of visas available to
refugees and prevented refugees from accessing the United States through
official ports of entry, many refugees found themselves with no practical
alternative other than to attempt an unauthorized entry. Under these
circumstances, refugees could reasonably conclude that violating U.S.
immigration law was morally justified to facilitate their escape from death
or other serious harm abroad. Indeed, the harder the White House worked to
prevent refugees from presenting claims for asylum and withholding of
removal, the stronger the argument has become that prosecuting refugees for
immigration crimes was unconscionable.
In sum, this Article lays bare why prosecuting refugees is both morally
and legally indefensible. By jettisoning this practice, federal prosecutors and
judges may correct an ongoing miscarriage of justice, while realigning
domestic immigration policy with Congress’s statutory plan and the United
States’ international obligation to treat refugees with dignity and
compassion.

45

United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 n.19 (2001).
47
In March 2020, the United States joined other countries in drastically restricting the admission of
all foreign nationals in response to the global spread of COVID-19. Recognizing that public-health
emergencies like the COVID-19 crisis raise special legal and moral concerns, I do not address those
questions in this Article.
46
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I.

THE PATH TO REFUGEE PROSECUTION

To understand why prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry is
inconsistent with U.S. law, some historical context is essential. This Part
chronicles how Congress adopted provisions establishing immigration
crimes, while also making special provision for refugee protection. Although
Congress has imposed criminal penalties for illegal immigration for almost
a century, it has never contemplated that refugees would be subject to those
penalties. To the contrary, Congress designed the INA with the expectation
that it would comply fully with the United States’ obligations under
international law—including the Refugee Convention’s requirement to
refrain from penalizing refugees for unlawful entry. However, far from
implementing congressional policy, refugee prosecution emerged
haphazardly as an incidental byproduct of the post-9/11 national-security
state, when border agents—seeking to tighten border security—began to
refer irregular migrants for prosecution without regard to their refugee status.
Surveying the historical record as a whole, it is apparent that the United
States has stumbled into refugee prosecution without significant public
deliberation or congressional authorization.
A. Creating Immigration Crimes
Our story begins roughly a century ago. Prior to the 1920s, the federal
government treated entry into the United States as a matter within the
exclusive province of civil and administrative law. Violating immigration
controls at the border could trigger serious legal consequences—including
exclusion or deportation from the United States48—but not criminal
penalties.49 After the First World War, however, a shifting political landscape
prompted Congress to reconsider this approach. Public anxiety about
increasing migration from China, Mexico, and Southern and Eastern Europe,
coupled with declining demand for unskilled immigrant labor in the postWWI economy, emboldened nativist politicians to demand stricter legal

48
Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, U.S.
immigration law distinguished between the “exclusion” of migrants at the border prior to a lawful
admission and the “deportation” of previously admitted foreign nationals. See 5 CHARLES GORDON,
STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 64.01 (rev. ed. 2020). Subsequently, however, all inadmissible and deportable foreign nationals are
subject to “removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
49
See Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1925) (“It has never been the policy of this
Government to punish criminally aliens who come here in contravention of our immigration laws.
Deportation has been the remedy.”).
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constraints on immigration.50 Against this backdrop, Congress in 1924
criminalized counterfeiting immigration documents and obtaining such
documents by fraud.51 The following year, it allocated funding to establish a
Border Patrol—the first “serious enforcement mechanism against unlawful
entry.”52 When these measures failed to stem the flow of irregular migrants,
Congress entertained proposals to make illegal entry itself a criminal offense.
Supporters of criminalization found their champion in South Carolina
Senator Coleman Livingston Blease, a resolute segregationist and fierce
opponent of Mexican immigration.53 Senator Blease introduced draft
legislation, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, to establish the first criminal
penalties for unauthorized immigration.54 As amended, the bill made illegal
entry a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison, a $1,000 fine, or
both.55 Reentry following deportation was designated a felony punishable by
up to two years in prison, a $1,000 fine, or both.56
The Undesirable Aliens Act had far-reaching consequences. By the end
of the 1930s, the federal government had prosecuted more than 44,000
irregular migrants, necessitating the construction of three new penitentiaries
near the U.S.–Mexico border.57 Yet, despite the considerable resources
devoted to prosecuting irregular migrants, the Act eventually came to be
viewed as a failure. Prosecution and mass incarceration did not “seem to
have the deterrent effect expected” in stemming the flow of Mexican
immigrants across the southern border,58 while deportation and so-called
“voluntary” departures coerced by local law enforcement officials proved to
be more effective at suppressing unauthorized immigration.59
Over the next four decades, the federal government deemphasized
criminal enforcement in favor of exclusion, deportation, and voluntary
50

Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation
Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 75 (2003).
51
See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 22, 43 Stat. 153, 165, superseded by Pub. L.
No. 80-772, § 1542, 62 Stat. 683, 771 (1948).
52
Ngai, supra note 50, at 76 & n.14 (discussing the Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049).
53
Kelly Lytle Hernández, How Crossing the US-Mexico Border Became a Crime, THE
CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2017, 10:00 PM), http://theconversation.com/how-crossing-the-us-mexicoborder-became-a-crime-74604 [https://perma.cc/9Q54-KUXA].
54
Act of March 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, 45 Stat. 1551.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Hernández, supra note 53.
58
SEC’Y OF LAB., ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1933).
59
See JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER 33 (2002) (reporting that deportations and
voluntary departures between 1929 and 1935 resulted in the departure of 500,000 Mexican nationals and
suppressed immigration across the U.S.–Mexico border “to a negligible level”).
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departure.60 However, the prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry
remained on the books, and in 1952 they were folded into the landmark
INA.61 At the urging of federal officials, Congress reduced the maximum
penalty for illegal entry from one year to six months, allowing for the crime
to be reclassified as a “petty offense” that could be tried in fast-track
procedures before a magistrate judge without grand jury indictment or jury
trial.62
As time went on, the criminalization of U.S. immigration law gained
renewed popularity. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, legislators from
both political parties jockeyed to establish their “tough on crime”
credentials.63 During this period, Congress repeatedly revised the INA,
adding a variety of immigration-related crimes.64 These statutory
amendments perpetuated in revised form the longstanding criminal
prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry. As a result, the INA continues
to characterize these acts as crimes, with illegal reentry specifically
designated as a felony punishable by ten or more years in prison.65 Federal
courts have upheld these criminal penalties as permissible applications of
Congress’s constitutional power to regulate immigration.66
B. Legislating Refugee Protection
Alongside the criminalization of U.S. border control, Congress has also
established legal safeguards to protect refugees from persecution abroad.
These safeguards emerged after World War II, inspired in part by
60
See K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1917–23, 1933 (2019)
(discussing these trends). Voluntary departure entails a foreign national exiting the United States prior to
the issuance or enforcement of a removal order. Under current immigration law, voluntary departure has
become a form of relief that allows those who qualify to avoid the adverse legal consequences of a
removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (authorizing the Attorney General to grant voluntary departure).
61
See INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §§ 275–76, 66 Stat. 163, 229.
62
See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1326–27 (2010).
63
See Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2143–
44 (2017) (emphasizing bipartisan consensus about a “tough on crime” approach to immigration). See
generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 367, 376, 419 (2006) (discussing the criminalization of U.S. immigration law).
64
For a concise summary of these developments, see David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and
Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 164–175 (2012).
65
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326.
66
See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, 238 (1896) (stating that “it would be plainly
competent for [C]ongress to declare the act of an alien in remaining unlawfully within the United States
to be an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, if such offense were to be established by a judicial
trial”); United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]t no time during
the last century has any court questioned or contradicted Wong Wing’s endorsement of Congress’s
prerogative to enact criminal immigration laws.”).
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international negotiations that produced the Refugee Convention.67 Congress
gradually strengthened the statutory safeguards for refugees, culminating in
the United States’ accession to the Refugee Protocol68 and passage of the
landmark Refugee Act of 1980.69 A consistent theme in the legislative history
of both the Refugee Protocol and the Refugee Act is Congress’s concerted
focus on ensuring that domestic law complied fully with the United States’
obligations under international law.70 The historical record therefore offers
powerful evidence that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry is
inconsistent with Congress’s statutory plan.
Refugee law as we know it today began to take shape in the United
States beginning with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which established
a special immigrant quota for refugees.71 Although Congress discontinued
this quota in 1957,72 it authorized the Attorney General to admit specific
categories of refugees throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, pursuant to
special “parole” and “conditional entry” programs.73 In 1950, Congress also
authorized the Attorney General to refrain from deporting foreigners to
countries where they would be threatened with physical harm. 74
As the United States was implementing these statutory frameworks,
legal reform was also taking place at the international level. In 1951, the
Refugee Convention established a new global regime for refugee protection.
In relevant part, the Refugee Convention defines a “refugee” as
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. 75

States–parties to the Refugee Convention commit that they will not
“expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
67

See GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 33.01.
Refugee Protocol, supra note 17.
69
Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
70
See infra text accompanying notes 91–95.
71
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-744, 62 Stat. 1009, 1010–11, amended by Acts of June 16,
1960, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, and June 28, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96.
72
Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 10, 71 Stat. 639, 642.
73
See GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 33.01[1]–[2] (discussing the development of refugee policies
in the United States after World War II).
74
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010. Fifteen
years later, Congress eliminated the requirement that persecution be physical. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918.
75
Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(A)–(A)(2).
68
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account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.”76
The Refugee Convention also anticipates that states might be tempted
to use civil or criminal sanctions to deter or punish refugee immigration. To
counter this temptation, Article 31 declares:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their
life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in
their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.77

Several features of this text merit unpacking. As a general rule, Article
31 enjoins states–parties from imposing any penalties—civil or criminal—
based on refugees’ irregular entry or presence. To claim this immunity,
however, refugees must “com[e] directly from a territory where their life or
freedom was threatened,” “present themselves without delay to the
authorities,” and “show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”78 The
Refugee Convention’s preamble and preparatory work (travaux
préparatoires) underscore that these qualifications are to be construed
liberally in favor of refugee protection, reflecting the Refugee Convention’s
overarching objective “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of
[the] fundamental rights and freedoms” affirmed by “the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 79 The
purpose of these limitations clauses was not to compel refugees to pursue
asylum in the first country of transit on pain of penalties elsewhere.80 Rather,
the preparatory work makes clear that these qualifications were designed to
ensure that refugees who had already received asylum—a durable legal
status81—in one receiving state would not thereafter have an unfettered right
76
Id. art. 33(1) (emphasis added). The Convention qualifies this obligation by providing that it does
not apply, inter alia, if “there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” Id. art. 33(2).
77
Id. art. 31(1).
78
Id.
79
Id. pmbl.; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (authorizing recourse to preparatory work when other
conventional means of interpretation leave a treaty “ambiguous or obscure”).
80
See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION, DETENTION, AND PROTECTION 5–8 (2001), https://
www.unhcr.org/3bcfdf164.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAJ7-5WVM] (prepared at the request of UNHCR for
an expert roundtable held in Geneva, Switzerland on November 8–9, 2001).
81
Unlike refugees who are granted only withholding of removal, a form of temporary relief that
expires when refugees are no longer threatened with persecution abroad, those who receive asylum may
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to violate other countries’ border controls without legal repercussions.82
Hence, refugees do not forfeit their immunity from prosecution under Article
31 if they travel through other states, provided that they do not establish
prolonged residence or receive a firm offer of asylum along the way.83 As
long as refugees travel continuously toward the country where they first seek
asylum, they are understood to “com[e] directly” from their home country
for purposes of Article 31, and are entitled to seek refuge without suffering
civil or criminal penalties for illegal entry in their destination country.
Although the United States did not join the Refugee Convention, it
agreed to be bound by Article 31 when it acceded to the Refugee Protocol in
1968.84 At the time, neither the White House nor Congress appeared to have
anticipated any conflict between Article 31 and the INA. In his letter
transmitting the Refugee Protocol for advice and consent, President Lyndon
B. Johnson assured the Senate that “[a]ccession to the Protocol would not
impinge adversely upon established practices under existing laws in the
United States.”85 In his view, there were only “two instances where
divergences between the Convention and United States laws would cause
difficulty”—Article 24 (addressing labor law and social security) and Article

apply for permanent residence after one year, bring immediate family members to the United States, and
eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship. See Benefits and Responsibilities of Asylees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/benefitsand-responsibilities-asylees [https://perma.cc/9MQV-NATW].
82
See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, at 5–8.
83
See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (2005)
(explaining that the “coming directly” language of Article 31 “does not disfranchise” refugees who have
“passed through, or even [have] been provisionally admitted to, another country”); PAUL WEIS, THE
REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES ANALYZED WITH A COMMENTARY 215,
219,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-travauxpreparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html [https://perma.cc/GVG6-TKMK] (summarizing the
Refugee Convention’s preparatory work as affirming that refugees are not to be penalized simply because
they “could have sought asylum in another country” en route). Support for this reading can be found in
Article 31(2), which requires states–parties to give refugees in transit “a reasonable period and all the
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.” Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art.
31(2).
84
See Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 1(1) (“The States Parties to the present Protocol
undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the [Refugee] Convention . . . .”); Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees: Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 90-27, CONGRESS.GOV
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/90th-congress/27?r=2&s=1 [https://perma.cc/F3CM-98V7]
(noting that the Senate voted 59–0 in favor of ratification on October 4, 1968). The United States did not
submit any reservations, understandings, or declarations with respect to Article 31. Nor has the Executive
Branch ever offered a formal interpretation of Article 31 that would call into question the conventional
understanding reflected in the Convention’s preparatory work.
85
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal, Aug. 1, 1968, 114 CONG. REC. 27757, 27757
(1968) [hereinafter Johnson Letter].
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29 (addressing taxation).86 President Johnson stressed that he had proposed
“appropriate reservations” that would address those differences between the
Refugee Protocol and U.S. law.87 Subsequent Senate hearings on the Refugee
Protocol do not reveal any expressions of concern about possible tensions
between Article 31 and the INA.88 As far as can be discerned from the public
record, none of the central players in the United States’ adoption of the
Refugee Protocol contemplated the possibility that the INA could be used to
prosecute refugees in violation of Article 31.
A decade later, Congress revisited the relationship between the Refugee
Protocol and the INA in debates that culminated in the passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980.89 By the late 1970s, federal policymakers had come to
recognize that certain aspects of the INA were out of sync with the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. A primary purpose of the Refugee Act, therefore,
was to ensure that the United States complied fully with its obligations under
the Refugee Protocol.90 In addition to amending the INA’s “refugee”
definition to track the Refugee Convention (Article 1), the Refugee Act
revised the INA’s provision on withholding of deportation (later restyled as
“withholding of removal”) to parallel the Refugee Convention’s prohibition
of refoulement (Article 33).91 Most relevant for present purposes, the
Refugee Act conformed the INA’s withholding provision to Article 31 by
providing that refugees would not be denied access to relief in immigration
court if they had entered the United States unlawfully.92 Congress also

86
Id.; U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATE PARTIES, INCLUDING DECLARATIONS AND
RESERVATIONS, TO THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 5 [hereinafter STATE
PARTIES], https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/convention/5d9ed66a4 [https://perma.cc/RXE66QF5].
87
Johnson Letter, supra note 85; see also STATE PARTIES, supra note 86; S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELS., PROTOCOL RELATING TO REFUGEES, S. REP. NO. 90-14, at 7 (1968) [hereinafter SENATE
PROTOCOL REPORT] (“[T]he United States already meets the standards of the Protocol . . . .”).
88
See SENATE PROTOCOL REPORT, supra note 87, at 2 (expressing the Senate’s understanding that,
subject to two unrelated exceptions, “the protocol would not impinge adversely upon the Federal and
State laws of this country”).
89
Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
90
See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009) (“As this Court has twice recognized, one of
Congress’ primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles agreed to in the
[Refugee Convention], as well as the [Refugee Protocol].” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
91
See Refugee Act § 202(e); GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 33.01[3] (establishing that “[a]
predominant goal of [the Refugee Act] was to implement the United Nations Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees”).
92
By authorizing withholding of removal not only for asylum-seekers in deportation proceedings
(i.e., those who had previously been formally admitted), but also for asylum-seekers in exclusion
proceedings (i.e., those who had entered previously without formal admission and would otherwise be
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authorized the Attorney General to grant asylum on a discretionary basis to
refugees who were either already in the United States or seeking entry at a
land border or through a designated port of entry.93 In each of these respects,
the Refugee Act reflected Congress’s concerted effort to harmonize U.S.
refugee law with Article 31.
At no point during the three years of debates that preceded the Refugee
Act did anyone involved indicate on the public record that additional
legislative action might be necessary to harmonize the INA with Article 31.
Though this omission is significant, it is not entirely surprising. Throughout
this period, federal policymakers generally drew firm distinctions between
refugees and other migrants, characterizing these categories as distinct
populations to be handled through separate regulatory regimes. For example,
Attorney General Griffin Bell emphasized in testimony to Congress that
“refugee problems,” which posed sensitive questions of foreign policy and
international law, should not be conflated with the distinct challenge of
“illegal immigration” by economic migrants, which Congress had
endeavored to curb through a distinct regulatory regime based on exclusion,
deportation, and civil and criminal penalties.94 Having distinguished refugees
from other migrants in this way, the idea that refugees might face prosecution
for illegal entry and reentry does not appear to have occurred to anyone who
participated in the congressional deliberations that produced the Refugee
Act—not to members of Congress, critics of expansive refugee admission,
refugee rights advocates, or even the Attorney General.
Congress’s silence on this subject is particularly noteworthy given that
irregular entry by refugees was a topic of sustained discussion at a critical
juncture during these debates. Early on, as the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law
considered proposals that would lead eventually to the Refugee Act, the
faced with “return”), the Refugee Act enabled irregular entrants to qualify for protection from
refoulement.
93
Refugee Act § 208.
94
Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Refugees, & Int’l
L. of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 33 (1979) [hereinafter May 1979 Hearings] (testimony
of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell); see also id. at 32 (asserting that the “problem of Mexican citizens
coming across the border to work in our country” was not “a refugee problem”); JOYCE C. VIALET, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952–1979, at 71–78 (1979) (report prepared at the
request of Senator Edward Kennedy for inclusion in the congressional record) (distinguishing the entry
of aliens “illegally, as undocumented aliens” from entry “legally as refugees”); Admission of Refugees
into the United States Part II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, and Int’l L. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 187 (1978) (testimony of Leo Cherne) [hereinafter Cherne]
(observing that the United States has maintained a “decisive distinction between . . . refugees and the host
of unfortunates who illegally cross our borders to seek work,” given that the former “live lives of total
repression, pervasive fear, arbitrary arrest and death”).
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subcommittee chair, Representative Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania,
introduced a bill that would have disqualified refugees from receiving
sanctuary if they failed to apply for withholding of deportation promptly
after an illegal entry or if they failed to show good cause for their illegal
entry.95 Eilberg’s proposal failed to attract sufficient support in Congress
after the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State
Department opposed it as being “out of character with our traditional concern
for refugees” and as potentially “result[ing] in a conflict with our obligations
under section 33 of the refugee protocol.”96 After Eilberg’s proposal was
eliminated from consideration, but before Congress enacted the Refugee Act,
representatives of Amnesty International applauded this decision in
congressional testimony, observing that the proposal would have violated
Article 31 through the “imposition of penalties on refugees who, under
certain circumstances, enter the country illegally.”97
Given all the Sturm und Drang that surrounded Eilberg’s proposal, one
would expect that if members of Congress believed refugees were subject to
criminal liability under the INA for illegal entry and reentry, they would have
attempted to resolve this incongruity with international law in the Refugee
Act. At a minimum, the issue surely would have received a passing mention
at some point during the many lengthy hearings that preceded passage of the
Refugee Act.98 Eilberg’s proposal demonstrates that INS, the State
95

Extension of Indochina Refugee Assistance Program: Hearings on H.R. 9133, H.R. 9134, and H.R.
9110 Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, & Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. 1, 33 (1977). See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 40–41 (1981) (discussing the
legislative history of Representative Eilberg’s proposal). Eilberg’s proposal appeared in multiple bills
before dropping out of the final Refugee Act.
96
Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearings on H.R. 3056 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigr., Citizenship, & Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 60, 63 (1977) (testimony
of John W. DeWitt, Deputy Administrator, U.S. State Department, opposing this provision); see also
Admission of Refugees into the United States, Part II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigr.,
Citizenship, & Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 216–20, 227 (1978) (testimony of
INS Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo opposing this part of Eilberg’s proposal as “too harsh,” “entirely
out of line with this country’s humanitarian principles,” and inconsistent with Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention).
97
See May 1979 Hearings, supra note 94 (testimony of A. Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum
emphasizing how this change was necessary to harmonize the INA with Article 31 of the Refugee
Protocol).
98
For a taste of these hearings, see, for example, U.S. Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980) (416 pages); The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R.
2816, Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the H. Comm. of Foreign Affs., 96th Cong. (1979) (104
pages); May 1979 Hearings, supra note 97 (466 pages); Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigr., Refugees, & Int’l L of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979) (400
pages).
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Department, and members of Congress were well aware that refugees were
entering the United States outside official ports of entry. Yet, the legislative
history of the Refugee Act does not indicate that members of Congress
foresaw the possibility that federal prosecutors might try to use the INA to
punish refugees for illegal entry or reentry. As far as Congress and the
Executive Branch were concerned, the criminal penalties for illegal entry and
reentry were designed solely for unauthorized economic migrants, not
refugees.
After passing the Refugee Act, Congress continued to tinker with the
definitions of immigration crimes and their associated penalties. It amended
the criminal prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry through a series of
legislative enactments that included the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,99 the
Immigration Act of 1990,100 the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994,101 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.102 Collectively, the legislative history
for these acts runs tens of thousands of pages, reflecting Congress’s sustained
engagement with the challenge of containing unauthorized migration.103 Yet,
even as Congress repeatedly revised the INA in an effort to “address the
problem of the ‘revolving door’ at the southern land border” for economic
migrants,104 no one involved in these debates ever raised the possibility that
refugees might also be vulnerable to prosecution for illegal entry or reentry.
The best reading of the historical record as a whole, therefore, is that
Congress designed the INA’s criminal prohibitions against illegal entry and
reentry with ordinary economic migrants in mind, believing that refugees
were subject to different rules.
C. Stumbling into Refugee Prosecution
Piecing together how and why the federal government began
prosecuting refugees requires further detective work. The best available

99

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–72.
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 121(b)(2)–(3), 543(b)(2)–(3), 104 Stat. 4978,
4994, 5059.
101
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 13001,
108 Stat. 1796, 2023.
102
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 307, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612.
103
In preparing to write this Article, my research team reviewed the entire legislative history of
8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a) and 1326, as well as the Refugee Protocol and the Refugee Act. A comprehensive
list of the relevant materials, comprising tens of thousands of pages, is on file with the author.
104
IMMIGRATION IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST ACT OF 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 155
(1996).
100
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evidence indicates that federal agencies embraced refugee prosecution as
official Executive Branch policy only relatively recently, after decades of
rejecting the idea that refugees were criminally liable for illegal entry and
reentry.
Prior to the twenty-first century, refugee prosecution appears to have
been virtually nonexistent. During the 1980s and 1990s, a handful of cases
popped up in the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement featuring
criminal defendants who asserted that they were refugees fleeing
persecution. In nearly all of these cases, prosecutors contested the
defendants’ assertions that they were refugees, and courts agreed that the
defendants had failed to prove a well-founded fear of immediate harm in
their home countries.105 Only two cases involved prosecutors deliberately
bringing charges against refugees. Further, the record in those cases indicates
that the defendants were not entitled to enter the United States because they
had engaged in the persecution of others or had committed particularly
serious crimes in the United States.106 Thus, federal case law suggests that
for at least two decades after the Refugee Act, federal prosecutors did not
deliberately target admissible refugees for prosecution for illegal entry or
reentry.107
However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about a sea change in the
Executive Branch’s approach to immigration enforcement. In the wake of
the attacks, Congress committed civil immigration enforcement to a new
agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), reflecting a
fundamental shift in emphasis toward a more security-focused approach to
immigration policy.108 DOJ also allocated more resources to the prosecution
105
See, e.g., United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Simo, 68 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710–11 (E.D. Va. 1999).
106
See United States v. Joya-Martinez, 947 F.2d 1141, 1142 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
defendant had been “a member of a death squad and that on eight occasions, under official orders, he
murdered prisoners after brutal interrogations”); United States v. Nwene, 20 F. Supp. 2d 716, 717–18
(D.N.J. 1998) (considering the case of an asylum-seeker who had been removed previously based on an
aggravated felony conviction for bank larceny).
107
Given the prevalence of plea bargaining in federal criminal law, it is impossible to rule out the
possibility that refugee prosecution may have been practiced to some degree during this period.
Nonetheless, the absence of published decisions reflecting any such practice is noteworthy. At a
minimum, the absence of any published evidence of refugee prosecution offers a good reason to reject
the possibility that Congress might have implicitly endorsed the practice when it reenacted §§ 1325(a)
and 1326 during the 1980s and 1990s.
108
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, §§ 101, 402(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142,
2153 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111). See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration
Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1369, 1373, 1398–1404 (2007) (explaining “how national security concerns have come to
dominate” immigration policy, sidelining other economic, political, and social concerns).
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of immigration crimes, causing immigration-related convictions to
skyrocket. By 2004, federal judges were sentencing over 30,000 people a
year for immigration crimes—roughly a four-fold increase from a decade
earlier.109
In 2005, DHS rolled out a new initiative to tackle unauthorized
migration across the southern border. Dubbed “Operation Streamline,” this
program encouraged federal prosecutors to bring criminal charges against
foreign migrants apprehended for entering the United States without
inspection.110 First-time offenders would be held in federal prisons pending
fast-track criminal hearings before magistrate judges, followed by expedited
removal proceedings or hearings in immigration court.111 For repeat
offenders, federal prosecutors had a choice. They could charge a foreign
national with felony illegal reentry and send her to federal district court.
Alternatively, they could invite her to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
misdemeanor illegal entry and route her to a magistrate judge for conviction
and sentencing alongside first-time offenders.112
During this period, DOJ pressed charges against some refugees who
entered the United States without inspection.113 For example, in United States
v. Vazquez-Landaver, federal prosecutors brought criminal charges against
an asylum-seeker from El Salvador who had used human smugglers to enter
the United States without inspection after receiving threats from corrupt
police officers in his home countryx.114 Similarly, in United States v. Xian
Long Yao, a Chinese national who feared persecution for violating China’s
one-child policy faced criminal charges for illegally reentering Guam.115 In
both cases, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the defendants were vulnerable to
prosecution and rejected the defendants’ necessity and duress defenses.116

109

Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135,
139 (2009).
110
Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 125–27, 126 n.320
(2012).
111
Id.
112
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, FACT SHEET: PROSECUTING MIGRANTS FOR COMING TO THE UNITED
STATES
(2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-prosecutions
[https://perma.cc/RKS5-BUT9].
113
See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Xian
Long Yao, 302 F. App’x 586 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. United States v. Malenge (Malenge II), 294 F. App’x
642 (2d Cir. 2008) (charged based on false personation, misuse of a passport, and false use of a passport);
United States v. Barry (Barry II), 294 F. App’x 641 (2d Cir. 2008) (same).
114
Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d at 800–01, 806.
115
Xian Long Yao, 302 F. App’x at 587–88.
116
See Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d at 800–01; Xian Long Yao, 302 F. App’x at 587–88.
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In 2012, the Obama Administration expanded Streamline proceedings
nationwide, producing another massive spike in the prosecution of
immigration crimes.117 In 2013 alone, the Justice Department brought over
91,200 cases for illegal entry and reentry, a 500% increase from a decade
earlier.118 The following year, half of all federal arrests were for immigrationrelated offenses.119 CBP, the division of DHS responsible for apprehending
irregular migrants at the border, “made more arrests in 2014 (64,954) than
all of the agencies within DOJ combined (58,265).”120 Flooded with illegal
entry and reentry cases, magistrates in some locations decided up to eighty
cases per day,121 often combining a defendant’s initial appearance,
arraignment, plea, and sentencing into a single hearing.122 Nearly threequarters of a million people were prosecuted for illegal entry or reentry
between 2005 and 2016, at an estimated cost of $7 billion.123 Ninety-nine
percent of the defendants in these proceedings pleaded guilty. 124 As a result,
federal courts delivered more convictions for illegal entry and reentry during
this period than for all other federal crimes combined.125 The era of mass
immigration incarceration was now in full swing.
As criminal immigration enforcement gained momentum under the
Bush and Obama Administrations, immigrant-rights advocates expressed

117
Keller, supra note 110, at 123–24. The Obama Administration eventually rebranded Operation
Streamline as the “Criminal Consequence Initiative.” Lomi Kriel, Streamlined: Trump Pressing for Mass
Criminalization of Illegal Border Crossers, HOUS. CHRON., http://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Trump-pressing-for-mass-criminalization-of-11962046.php
[https://perma.cc/2C57-KGDH].
118
Kriel, supra note 117. This spike in prosecutions coincided with a similarly explosive increase in
deportations. See ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 2
(2004) (observing that the United States conducted 438,421 deportations in 2013).
119
Kriel, supra note 117.
120
John Gramlich & Kristen Bialik, Immigration Offenses Make Up a Growing Share of Federal
Arrests, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/10/
immigration-offenses-make-up-a-growing-share-of-federal-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/Q2AJ-THVP].
121
Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 481, 486 (2010).
122
Id.; see also Eagly, supra note 62, at 1351 (quoting defense attorneys who described these
procedures as a “cattle call” or “assembly line”).
123
See JUDITH A. GREENE, BETHANY CARSON & ANDREA BLACK, INDEFENSIBLE: A DECADE OF
MASS INCARCERATION OF MIGRANTS PROSECUTED FOR CROSSING THE BORDER, at viii (2016); Sklansky,
supra note 64, at 166.
124
Lydgate, supra note 121, at 484.
125
Id.; Sklansky, supra note 64, at 166.
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dismay that Border Patrol agents and federal prosecutors were failing to
screen out bona fide refugees.126 DHS’s Inspector General reported that
Border Patrol does not have guidance on whether to refer to Streamline
prosecution aliens who express fear of persecution or fear of return to their
home countries. As a result, Border Patrol agents sometimes use Streamline to
refer aliens expressing such fear to DOJ for prosecution. Using Streamline to
refer aliens expressing fear of persecution, prior to determining their refugee
status, may violate U.S. obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States ratified in 1968.127

The Inspector General noted further that although some Border Patrol
sectors128 were referring asylum-seekers to federal prosecutors, others
declined to do so, concluding that refugees were “not the ‘best candidates’
for Streamline prosecution.”129 Moreover, CBP “officials at headquarters
were unsure whether it is permissible to refer aliens expressing fear [of
persecution] to Streamline.”130
Spurred by the Inspector General’s inquiry, CBP doubled down on
refugee prosecution:
CBP . . . responded that it is imperative the criminal and administrative
processes be separate avenues. Inclusion in one does not exclude inclusion in
the other. CBP can prosecute an undocumented alien criminally, while at the
same time the alien makes a claim to credible fear administratively. Neither
process affects the outcome of the other. The fact that an undocumented alien
is being prosecuted does not influence the outcome of his or her credible fear
claim. The claim of credible fear cannot be used as a criterion to exclude an
undocumented alien from a possible prosecution for a criminal act.131

Consistent with new policy, the Chief of Border Protection issued a
guidance memorandum in November 2014 directing that unlawful entrants
in Streamline proceedings should be referred for prosecution, irrespective of
whether they claimed a credible fear of persecution abroad.132
126
Emily Puhl, Prosecuting the Persecuted: How Operation Streamline and Expedited Removal
Violate Article 31 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol, 25 BERKELEY LA RAZA
L.J. 87, 94 (2015).
127
INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 16.
128
Border Patrol sectors are centrally supervised CPB divisions comprised of stations from which
Border Patrol agents operate. See Border Control Sectors, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors
[https://perma.cc/982Z56GC].
129
INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 17.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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Refugee prosecution became further entrenched in Executive Branch
policy after Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. Just days after
taking office, President Trump signed an executive order calling on the
Attorney General to make prosecuting immigration crimes a “high
priority.”133 Attorney General Jeff Sessions later implemented this direction
by issuing an official “zero tolerance” policy for irregular immigration along
the southern border.134 U.S. Attorney’s Offices would thereafter be required
“to prosecute all Department of Homeland Security referrals of [illegal entry
and reentry] violations, to the extent practicable.”135
Immigration prosecutions once again rose dramatically.136 Over the
twelve months following Attorney General Sessions’s announcement of the
zero-tolerance policy, DOJ initiated over 8,000 prosecutions for immigration
crimes every single month.137 Although not expressly targeted at refugees per
se, the zero-tolerance policy established a department-wide expectation that
prosecutors would endeavor (within the limits of available resources) to
bring charges against every foreign national who attempted illegal entry or
reentry, irrespective of refugee status.138 Consequently, defense attorneys
observed a spike in the number of asylum-seekers targeted for prosecution
after the zero-tolerance policy arrived on the scene.139
D. Misjudging Refugees
As criminal charges against asylum-seekers have flooded federal
courts, district judges and magistrates who handle these cases have
133

Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Zero-Tolerance, supra note 5.
135
Id.
136
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 4 (“After implementing Sessions’ memos, the federal
court in Tucson, Arizona went from hearing between 10 and 40 cases a day to regularly hearing 75 per
day—an increase fueled by prosecutions of first-time entrants.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to
Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1984–86 (2020) (documenting a sharp spike in
prosecutions for illegal entry after the zero-tolerance announcement).
137
See TRAC, supra note 8 (providing a chart tracking monthly immigration prosecutions during
this period).
138
See Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks Discussing the Immigration
Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions
[https://perma.cc/C92V-9LHD] (announcing that “the Department of Homeland Security is now referring
100 percent of illegal Southwest Border crossings to the Department of Justice for prosecution” and that
“the Department of Justice will take up those cases”).
139
See HUM. RTS. FIRST, ZERO-TOLERANCE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: PUNISHING ASYLUM
SEEKERS AND SEPARATING FAMILIES 1 (2018) (“Criminal prosecutions of asylum seekers . . . have
sharply increased since the implementation of the zero-tolerance policy, with many federal courts
experiencing record high numbers.”).
134
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concluded that a defendant’s refugee status does not preclude criminal
prosecution.140 For example, Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco, who has
presided over Streamline proceedings in Tucson, has asserted: “We have
criminal courts and civil immigration courts. A credible claim of fear is no
defense to a criminal prosecution.”141 His colleague, Magistrate Judge Eric J.
Markovich, has offered a similar assessment:
Defense lawyers will frequently say their client has a ‘credible fear’ of being
returned to their home country. I tell people that they’ll have to bring this up
later in immigration court. I don’t mean to cut people off, but I’m not an
immigration judge and I have no real legal authority to do anything about this
issue.142

Comparable statements appear in recent opinions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals and federal district courts.143 These courts have simply assumed that
refugees are vulnerable to prosecution for illegal entry and reentry without
engaging in a rigorous way with the INA’s text, context, and purpose. Nor
have they considered whether refugee prosecution under the INA is
consistent with traditional canons of federal statutory interpretation, such as
the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on constitutional avoidance, and the
rule of lenity. The conventional wisdom today, therefore, is that the
prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry apply equally to refugees and
nonrefugees alike.
One tragic consequence is that courts have allowed refugees detained
at the border to be separated from their accompanying children. In United
States v. Vasquez-Hernandez,144 the Fifth Circuit held that asylum-seekers
140
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9 (“While deciding an asylum claim in the first
instance is beyond the jurisdiction of federal district and magistrate courts, Human Rights First did not
observe a single case in which a federal judge hesitated to convict and sentence asylum seekers—other
than occasionally offering brief words of sympathy . . . .”).
141
GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 110 (quoting Magistrate Judge Velasco). Notably,
Judge Velasco has been a vocal critic of Operation Streamline. See Tom Roberts, A ‘Maddening’ System,
from Courtrooms to Shelters, NAT’L CATH. REP. (July 1, 2011), https://www.ncronline.org/
news/maddening-system-courtrooms-shelters [https://perma.cc/KU9M-HZ5X] (discussing Judge
Velasco’s criticisms).
142
GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 110 (quoting Magistrate Judge Markovich); see
also Kriel, supra note 117 (describing how Magistrate Judge Collis White told asylum-seekers in Del
Rio, Texas that “there was nothing he could do in this court,” so “[t]hey would have to take up their
claims with an immigration officer after serving their sentence”).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 924 F.3d 164, 1669 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding
that asylum-seekers are “alien[s]” under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), and that “[q]ualifying for asylum under
8 U.S.C. § 1158 would not change [their] alien status”); United States v. Ramirez-Ortiz, 370 F. Supp. 3d
1151, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (asserting that “a plain reading of the statutes suggests that . . . Congress
chose not to grant immunity to asylum seekers who face criminal prosecution”).
144
924 F.3d at 164.
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from El Salvador and Honduras could not invoke their refugee status as a
basis for avoiding criminal detention and family separation pending their
prosecution for illegal entry.145 The court explained that the defendants had
not “shown that qualifying for asylum would be relevant to whether they
improperly entered, since [the INA’s prohibition against illegal entry]
applies to ‘[a]ny alien’ who ‘enters or attempts to enter the United States at
any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers.’”146
Because the defendants had previously “stipulated that they were aliens and
entered the United States at a place that was not a port of entry,”147 the court
reasoned that they were proper targets for prosecution under the INA and
that their separation from their children pending their criminal trials was
therefore permissible.
When federal judges tell asylum-seekers that they cannot invoke their
well-founded fear of persecution as a defense to prosecution, the vast
majority simply plead guilty.148 Occasionally, however, refugees have
attempted to escape criminal liability by arguing that their well-founded fear
of persecution abroad supports a necessity or duress defense. However,
federal courts have not been kind to these arguments. Almost without
exception, they have concluded that the harms refugees fear are not
sufficiently “imminent” to qualify for common law necessity or duress
defenses.149 Moreover, courts have held that these defenses are not ordinarily
available to refugees because refugees cannot prove that violating U.S.
immigration controls was the only option reasonably available to them to
guarantee their safety.150 The upshot of these decisions seems to be that a
145

Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 169.
147
Id.
148
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 5, 19–20.
149
See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla-Siciliano, 643 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a
defendant’s “generalized fear of harm from the government and gang members . . . did not make a prima
facie showing” of “an imminent threat of harm”); United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802–
03 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an asylum-seeker fleeing a threat of persecution in El Salvador had
no duress defense because “[a] threat raising the possibility of action after thirty days does not meet the
requirements of ‘immediacy,’” and he was not “escaping an immediate threat of harm” at the moment
“he violated the law by crossing the border” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Brizuela, No. B-13-CR-476-1, 2014 WL 2257405, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2014) (“Defendant’s
testimony that he generally feared for his life in El Salvador . . . is insufficient to meet the imminent harm
element of duress.”); United States v. Ramirez-Chavez, No. 13–00490 DAE, 2013 WL 3581959, at *4
(W.D. Tex. July 2, 2013) (“Fear of future harm does not satisfy the present, imminent, and impending
threat requirement.”).
150
See, e.g., Bonilla-Siciliano, 643 F.3d at 591 (holding that a defendant from El Salvador could not
“show that he lacked a reasonable, legal alternative to illegally reentering the United States, because he
did not exclude the option of going to a country other than the United States or the handful of others that
146
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refugee cannot make out a successful necessity or duress defense unless her
persecutors chase her literally all the way to the U.S. border.151
Surprisingly, the more basic predicate for refugee prosecution—the
assumption that the INA’s criminal provisions apply to refugees—has yet to
be subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny. Federal judges simply take for
granted that refugees can be prosecuted for illegal entry and reentry. On
occasion, some have criticized refugee prosecution, lamenting that the
practice “is fundamentally inconsistent with the policies and obligations of
the federal government with regard to the treatment of refugees.”152 Thus far,
however, legal scholars and defense attorneys have not presented courts with
a successful argument for disallowing the practice entirely.
II. IS PROSECUTING REFUGEES LEGALLY DEFENSIBLE?
In this Part, I make the case that the INA does not, in fact, authorize
federal courts to penalize refugees for illegal entry or reentry. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, I show that the text, context, and purpose of the INA
offer substantial grounds to question the legality of refugee prosecution.
Moreover, traditional principles of federal statutory interpretation counsel
against interpreting the INA to authorize criminal penalties against refugees
for illegal entry and reentry. Federal prosecutors should therefore abandon
refugee prosecution, and federal courts should hold that prosecuting refugees
is legally indefensible.
A. Text, Context, and Purpose
In discerning whether Congress has authorized refugee prosecution, the
natural starting point for analysis is the statutory text.153 Specifically, our
inquiry must begin with the two provisions in Title 8 of the United States
Code that criminalize illegal entry and reentry: §§ 1325(a) and 1326.

he stated were dangerous”); United States v. Grainger, 239 F. App’x 188, 191–92 (6th Cir. 2007)
(concluding that an asylum-seeker who could have taken refuge in Canada on his way to the United States
could not establish a necessity defense). See generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980)
(“[I]f there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, ‘a chance both to refuse to do the
criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,’ the [duress and necessity] defenses will fail.”).
151
Compare United States v. Solorzano-Rivera, 368 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (characterizing
the defendant’s testimony that “chased by the police, he jumped over the 15-foot-high border fence” as
“central to his duress defense”), with Ramirez-Chavez, 2013 WL 3581959, at *4 (rejecting the defendant’s
duress defense because his kidnappers near the U.S.–Mexico border “were not in hot pursuit” when he
“slipped away . . . unnoticed” and “crossed the Rio Grande river without anyone pursuing him”).
152
Malenge II, 294 F. App’x 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2008).
153
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 283 (2011) (“We begin, as in any
case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute.”).
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Section 1326, which imposes criminal penalties for illegal reentry,
contains language that easily can be interpreted as exempting refugees from
prosecution. Although the text purports to authorize criminal penalties
against “any alien” who illegally reenters the country, it immediately pivots
to exclude from liability any foreign migrant who “establish[es] that he was
not required to obtain [the Attorney General’s] advance consent [to
admission] under this chapter or any prior Act.”154 Since most refugees
qualify to enter the United States without obtaining the Attorney General’s
discretionary consent in advance,155 the most natural reading of § 1326 is that
refugees enjoy immunity from criminal liability for illegal reentry.156 Thus,
while the text of § 1326 is not free from ambiguity, there is a powerful
argument that it does not apply on its face to refugees.
Section 1325(a) uses broad language to authorize criminal penalties
against
[a]ny alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or
place other than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes
examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or
obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading
representation or the willful concealment of a material fact. 157

On first impression, the words “[a]ny alien” might appear to encompass
refugees. When courts encounter the word “any” in federal statutes, they
usually interpret it expansively in accordance with its ordinary semantic
meaning.158 In light of this established practice, it is not hard to see why
154

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
See id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (providing that withholding of removal is not subject to the Attorney
General’s discretion); cf. id. § 1158(a)(1) (providing that refugees may qualify for asylum “irrespective
of [their immigration] status” and regardless of whether “[they are] at a designated port of arrival”). Under
the Refugee Convention and the INA, limited exceptions apply to refugees who are subject to exclusion
based on their having participated in the persecution of others on account of a protected ground, their
commission of a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States, or where there are “reasonable
grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.” Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B); see
also Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(F) (excluding refugees from the Convention’s protection
for these reasons).
156
See Gomez-Lopez v. United States, Nos. CV–14–0435–PHX–FJM (JFM), CR–12–0596–PHX–
FJM, 2014 WL 4639517, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2014) (noting that defendant had raised this
argument, but dismissing the case as time-barred); Puhl, supra note 126, at 104–05 (advancing this
argument). So far, this reading has not gained traction with federal prosecutors and judges. See, e.g.,
United States v. Castro-Rivas, 180 F. App’x 528, 528–29 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that refugees are
subject to criminal liability for illegal reentry).
157
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
158
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an
expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” (quoting WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1976))); Hui Ran Mu v. Barr, 936 F.3d 929, 933–35 (9th
155
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judges and prosecutors have concluded time and again that § 1325(a) applies
to refugees.159
Nonetheless, this reading is too simplistic. As the late Justice Antonin
Scalia and Bryan Garner have recognized, even “[s]eemingly absolute
criminal prohibitions” that use capacious terms like “any” and “every” can
sustain limiting interpretations.160 This is most obviously true in the criminal
context, where Congress legislates against a rich backdrop of substantive
interpretive canons.161 It is also true of federal refugee law, where the
Supreme Court has held that seemingly absolute prohibitions may support
implicit exceptions that are necessary to fulfill the Refugee Act’s
humanitarian purposes.162 This approach reflects the Court’s recognition that
maintaining a blinkered focus on particular provisions of the INA, without
attending to how those individual threads fit into the statute’s broader
tapestry for refugee protection, can produce distorted readings that do
violence to the INA’s overarching purposes.163 For this reason, the Court has
taken special care to avoid interpretive myopia by considering the INA’s full
text, history, and purposes whenever it seeks to discern the meaning of
particular provisions.
An illuminating example of this approach is Negusie v. Holder,164 where
the Supreme Court examined an INA provision that bars “any person” from
receiving asylum or withholding of removal if she has contributed to the

Cir. 2019) (holding that the words “any alien” have a broad meaning that reaches derivative beneficiaries
of a visa recipient); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 101 (2012) (discussing the general-terms canon, which provides that “general words,”
absent “some indication to the contrary,” should “be accorded their full and fair scope”).
159
See, e.g., supra note 143.
160
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 158, at 106; see also Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S.
Ct. 1743, 1750–51 (2019) (concluding in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas that the “context” of the
Class Action Fairness Act “demonstrates that Congress did not” mean for a provision authorizing “any
defendant” to remove a class action to federal court to authorize removal by counterclaim defendants);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[W]e are not to read general
words, such as [the words ‘[e]very person’] in this Act, without regard to the limitations customarily
observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.”).
161
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 158, at 106 (emphasizing that mens rea canons narrow even
criminal prohibitions that are phrased in absolute terms (e.g., “no person may”)).
162
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 519–20 (2009).
163
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“The meaning—or
ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”); Davis v.
Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.”); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (“Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.”).
164
555 U.S. 511.
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persecution of others.165 The central question in Negusie was whether this
“persecutor bar” applied “even if the [petitioner]’s assistance in persecution
was coerced or otherwise the product of duress.”166 The government asserted
that because the statutory text did not articulate an express exception for acts
committed under coercion or duress, no such exception could be inferred.167
However, the Supreme Court disagreed:
The silence is not conclusive. The question is whether the statutory text
mandates that coerced actions must be deemed assistance in persecution. On
that point the statute, in its precise terms, is not explicit. Nor is this a case where
it is clear that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue. 168

The Court concluded therefore that it should “look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and
to its object and policy,”169 including the statute’s evident purpose “to
implement the principles agreed to in the [Refugee Convention and
Protocol].”170 Because these contextual considerations did not definitively
resolve the textual ambiguity, the Court remanded the case to the agency for
further consideration.171
The Court followed a similar approach in Fernandez-Vargas v.
Gonzales.172 The controversy in Fernandez-Vargas centered on the INA
section that disqualifies refugees from receiving “any relief” from removal
if they entered the United States outside a designated port of entry after
having received a final order of removal.173 Notwithstanding the seemingly
absolute prohibition against “any relief,” the Supreme Court followed the
Attorney General’s lead in construing the provision narrowly to disallow
only discretionary forms of relief from removal (i.e., asylum), while leaving
intact nondiscretionary relief (i.e., withholding of removal and protection

165

Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
555 U.S. at 514 (paraphrasing the BIA’s determination that the “persecutor bar” does apply to the
circumstances in question).
167
Id. at 518 (citing the government’s brief).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 519 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008)).
170
Id. at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427
(1999)).
171
Id. at 523–25; see also id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing that the persecutor bar is
materially ambiguous). Only Justice Clarence Thomas concluded that the absence of an explicit
voluntariness requirement in the persecutor bar precluded interpreting the provision to include an implicit
coercion or duress exception. See id. at 551–54 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172
548 U.S. 30 (2006).
173
Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
166
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under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)).174 Although the Court did not
offer a robust defense of this interpretation, it apparently concluded that the
provision was sufficiently ambiguous—given the INA’s overarching
commitment to refugee protection—to justify deference to the Attorney
General’s narrowing interpretation.175 Consequently, the INA’s seemingly
categorical bar to “any relief” has not prevented lower courts from declaring
that “withholding from removal and CAT protection—both forms of
[nondiscretionary] relief—are actually still available to individuals in
reinstatement proceedings.”176
Taking cues from these cases, federal courts should acknowledge that
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 are ambiguous with respect to whether they apply to
refugees. This is most evident in § 1326, which specifies that all those who
need not gain advance consent from the Attorney General for admission are
free from criminal liability for illegal reentry. Although § 1325(a) does not
contain similar language, Congress’s “silence” on this score “is not
conclusive” because “the statute, in its precise terms, is not explicit” as to
whether refugees—who qualify for admission irrespective of where they
enter the United States—are subject to criminal penalties for illegal entry.177
Just like the Negusie petitioner, refugees can show that their acts were
compelled by threats to their life or basic freedom, thereby justifying and
excusing their irregular migration into the United States. At a minimum,
these factors raise serious questions about whether refugees—a distinctive
category of migrants who are eligible for admission under the INA—can be
prosecuted for illegal entry or reentry.

174

See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35 n.4; 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(e) (“If an alien [who] . . . has been
reinstated . . . expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order, the alien shall be
immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether the alien has a reasonable
fear of persecution or torture . . . .”); cf. id. § 1208.16(c)(4) (prescribing procedures for evaluating claims
to CAT relief in such cases); id. § 1208.31(e) (prescribing procedures for evaluating claims to withholding
of removal in such cases).
175
See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35 n.4 (“Notwithstanding the absolute terms in which the bar
on relief is stated, even an alien subject to § 241(a)(5) may seek withholding of removal . . . , or under
[CAT] . . . .”).
176
Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d. 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2017).
177
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009). When Congress includes an express exception “in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
1972)). This presumption makes little sense as applied to the relationship between §§ 1325(a) and 1326,
however, because it would lead to the absurd result that refugees could be prosecuted for an initial
irregular entry, but not for reentering immediately after a previous order of removal.
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Expanding the frame of reference to the full text of the INA and related
legislation offers further illumination.178 The Refugee Act’s preambular
statement of purpose emphasizes that the Act’s provisions—which do not
mention penalties of any kind—constitute the United States’
“comprehensive” regulatory framework for refugee admissions.179 This
declaration is consistent with the INA’s historical development through its
various amendments—a process that reflects Congress consistently
distinguishing nonrefugee migrants (to whom the criminal prohibitions
against illegal entry and reentry would apply) from refugees (who were to
receive special solicitude, consistent with the Refugee Protocol). Moreover,
the notion that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 apply to refugees is counterintuitive,
given that the INA expressly permits refugees to access asylum and
withholding of removal irrespective of where or how they entered the United
States.180 These features of the INA reflect Congress’s commitment to protect
all refugees at or within the United States’ borders—including those who
entered U.S. territory outside an official port of entry. Thus, even if the full
text of the INA and the Refugee Act might not conclusively foreclose the
possibility that refugees are criminally liable for illegal entry and reentry, at
a minimum they offer substantial reasons to question that conclusion.
A defender of refugee prosecution might draw attention to other
features of the INA’s full text. For example, the INA expressly authorizes
the Attorney General to exempt refugees from civil fines for failure to
present for inspection the travel documents they used to reach the United
States through a common carrier.181 If Congress expressly provided for a
waiver of civil liability in § 1324c, doesn’t this mean that other provisions in
the INA that don’t provide a waiver, such as §§ 1325(a) and 1326, should be
understood to authorize penalties against refugees (inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius)?
Not likely. To be sure, the fact that one provision in an act contains an
express exception while another in the same act does not often offers
valuable insight into Congress’s intent.182 This inference is not persuasive as
178
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 158, at 167 (observing that “no interpretive fault is more
common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider
the entire text, in view of its structure and the physical and logical relation of its many parts”).
179
See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
180
Pursuant to the Refugee Act, refugees may qualify for asylum and withholding of removal
“irrespective of [their immigration] status” and “whether or not [they are] at a designated port of arrival.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding of removal).
181
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6), (d)(7).
182
See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (“[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
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applied to § 1324c, however, because it ignores a key difference between
that provision and §§ 1325(a) and 1326. Namely, when Congress amended
§ 1324c(a)(6) of the INA in 1996 to authorize civil fines against foreign
nationals who failed to present travel documents to immigration officers,183
it targeted conduct outside the scope of the United States’ obligations under
the Refugee Protocol. The Refugee Protocol does not obligate the United
States to refrain from penalizing refugees for failing to present the travel
documents they used to reach a port of entry. Accordingly, the thenprevailing understanding that the INA exempted refugees from penalties for
illegal entry and reentry would not have covered this conduct. If Congress
wanted to exempt refugees from civil penalties under § 1324c(a)(6), it could
not rely on courts to use the Refugee Protocol as an interpretive guide; rather,
it would have to make this exception textually unambiguous. Congress
therefore had special reason to make explicit that the Attorney General could
waive these “new civil penalties” for refugees.184 This “special need for an
express provision undermines any temptation to invoke the interpretive
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.”185
The INA’s legislative history further supports the view that Congress
has not authorized refugee prosecution for illegal entry and reentry. As
explained in Part I, a “primary purpose[]” of the Refugee Act was to ensure
that U.S. immigration law satisfied the United States’ obligations under the
Refugee Protocol.186 Although Congress spent three years refining the
Refugee Act to ensure that U.S. immigration law would satisfy the Refugee
Protocol, no participant in these debates—including the Attorney General,
the federal government’s chief law enforcement officer—appears to have
believed that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 were inconsistent with Article 31 of the
Refugee Convention.187 Viewed in historical context, therefore, the absence
of any reference to refugee prosecution in the legislative record is a

presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23)); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512
(1981) (placing weight on the fact that Congress had included a voluntariness limitation in one provision
of the Displaced Persons Act but not in another provision).
183
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 212, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-570–71 (1996).
184
Id.
185
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010).
186
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative history
of . . . the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee
law into conformance with the [Refugee Protocol].”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 18 (1979)
(memorializing the House Judiciary Committee’s conclusion that the Refugee Act was necessary to
ensure “that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations under international agreements”).
187
See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
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paradigmatic example of “the [watch] dog that did not bark” in the night.188
Had members of Congress foreseen that criminal penalties might apply to
refugees, it is unimaginable that this would have escaped comment during
the deliberations that produced the Refugee Convention—particularly given
that members of Congress were keenly aware that refugees were entering the
United States outside designated ports of entry.189 On the rare occasion when
members of Congress addressed the prospect of penalizing refugees for
illegal entry, the idea excited fierce resistance from the Executive Branch
and was soundly rejected by members of Congress based on concerns that it
would be morally unconscionable and violate the United States’ international
obligations.190 Moreover, when Congress later amended §§ 1325(a) and 1326
in the 1980s and 1990s, legislators gave no sign that they anticipated
refugees would be subject to prosecution. To the contrary, they appear to
have contemplated that asylum-seekers at the border would receive refugee
status determinations, only after which they might face prosecution for
illegal entry or reentry if an asylum officer or immigration judge rejected
their petitions for protection.191

188
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (citing Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in
THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927)); see also id. at 396 (“We reject that construction because
we are convinced that if Congress had such an intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the statute,
or at least some of the Members would have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually
extensive legislative history . . . .”); cf. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes
so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives
may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”). In INS v. St. Cyr, the
Supreme Court relied in part on a similar inference from legislative history to support its holding that
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and IIRIRA did not apply retroactively
to petitions for discretionary relief filed before these acts entered force. 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.44 (2001)
(first citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); and then citing Harrison v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (supporting this proposition)). Outside the
immigration context, the Court has applied similar inferences from legislative silence in a variety of cases.
See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 91 (2007) (placing weight on the
fact that “[n]o one” involved in deliberations over the federal Impact Aid Act “expressed the view that
this statutory language . . . was intended to require, or did require, the Secretary to change the
Department’s system of calculation”); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[T]he fact that
[impacts on federalism] are not even discussed in the legislative history . . . strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend that the Travel Act should apply to criminal activity solely because that activity
is at times patronized by persons from another State.”).
189
See supra text accompanying notes 95–97.
190
See supra text accompanying notes 95–97.
191
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104828, pt. 2, at 209–10 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (outlining these procedures for refugee status determinations
and explaining that under IIRIRA, asylum-seekers who are unsuccessful in establishing their refugee
status in immigration court may not collaterally challenge their removal orders in subsequent criminal
prosecutions for illegal entry or reentry).
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Taking this historical context into account, it seems reasonable to infer
that when Congress last amended §§ 1325(a) and 1326, without changing the
text of these provisions, it implicitly endorsed the contemporaneous
understanding that refugees were not subject to criminal liability.192 Although
this inference might not place the meaning of §§ 1325(a) and 1326 beyond
all doubt, it bolsters the conclusion that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry
and reentry would not reflect “a fair understanding of the legislative plan”
for refugee protection as set out in the Refugee Act.193
Thus, attention to the whole text, context, and purposes of the INA
raises serious reasons to doubt whether §§ 1325(a) and 1326 apply to
refugees. When seeking to resolve the lingering ambiguity in these
provisions, the judiciary should bear in mind that “criminal laws are for
courts, not for the Government, to construe.”194 Hence, the interpretations
that DHS and DOJ have offered for §§ 1325(a) and 1326 are not entitled to
any deference in federal courts.195 Instead, the courts should seek guidance
from traditional tools of federal statutory interpretation.
B. Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Three interpretive canons, in particular, confirm that refugees are not
criminally liable for illegal entry or reentry: the Charming Betsy canon, the
canon on constitutional avoidance, and the rule of lenity.
1. The Charming Betsy Canon
Although conventional wisdom holds that the Refugee Protocol is a
non-self-executing treaty,196 courts may still use the Refugee Protocol as a
192
See United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compañia, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908) (“[R]eenactment by Congress, without change, of a statute which had previously received long-continued
executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction.”).
193
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan.”); cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
142–43 (2000) (concluding that although tobacco products could not be deemed “safe” within the
meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the legislative record as a whole indicated that Congress
implicitly exempted cigarettes from the Act’s coverage).
194
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014).
195
See United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) (“[W]e have never held that the
Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”).
196
Federal courts have overwhelmingly rejected the idea that the Refugee Protocol endows migrants
with rights that are enforceable in domestic courts. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez-Luna, No. 18mj-11463-WQH, 2019 WL 338947, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (“The Protocol does not confer
judicially enforceable rights that preclude his prosecution under [§ 1325(a)] for eluding inspection and
examination.”); United States v. Guevara-Medina, No. 18-mj-9443 BTM, 2018 WL 3970092, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 20, 2018) (“Defendant cannot rely on Article 31(1) of the Protocol to challenge his [§ 1325(a)]
prosecution.”); United States v. Munoz, No. CR-17-1078 PHX DGC, 2017 WL 4922047, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 30, 2017) (holding that a defendant “acquired no rights under the 1967 Protocol” and “accordingly
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guide to the meaning of §§ 1325(a) and 1326. According to the venerable
Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation, which takes its name from
the 1804 case Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, “an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”197 The Charming Betsy canon establishes a rebuttable
presumption that when courts encounter statutory ambiguity, they should
select an interpretation that satisfies the United States’ obligations under
international law.198 This presumption minimizes the potential for friction
with foreign powers199 and ensures that decisions about the United States’
compliance with international law remain firmly in the hands of the
politically accountable President and Congress.200
Federal courts have expressed divergent views about what kind of
evidence would be sufficient to rebut the Charming Betsy presumption. On
some occasions, courts have asserted that the presumption can be overcome
only by a clear statement from Congress.201 In other cases, they have asked
cannot rely on these international agreements as a basis for dismissing his [§ 1326] indictment”). Some
legal scholars have argued that some of the Refugee Protocol’s provisions are self-executing. See
McDonnell & Merton, supra note 33, at 78–94 (arguing for the self-executing nature of Article 31);
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The “Self-Executing” Character of the Refugee Protocol’s Nonrefoulement
Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993) (arguing for the self-executing nature of Article 33). This
conclusion has become less certain since the Supreme Court indicated in Medellín v. Texas that it might
require a clear statement in a treaty’s text or ratification history before it will interpret the treaty to be
self-executing. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 517 (2008). But see Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 599, 646–67 (2008) (disputing this reading of Medellín). But even if Article 31 is self-executing,
a Charming Betsy analysis is still necessary to explain why later-in-time reenactments of §§ 1325(a) and
1326 do not deprive Article 31 of legal force.
197
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (affirming this principle); Laurtizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953)
(same). Although Charming Betsy looked to customary international law as a guide to statutory
interpretation, the Supreme Court has taken the same approach to treaties of the United States. See, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 & n.12 (1963); Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (citing Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884)).
198
See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003); Rebecca Crootof, Note, Judicious
Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L.J. 1784, 1789
(2011).
199
See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he purpose of the Charming
Betsy canon is to avoid the negative ‘foreign policy implications’ of violating the law of nations.” (quoting
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32)).
200
See Bradley, supra note 36, at 525 (describing Charming Betsy “as a means of both respecting
the formal constitutional roles of Congress and the President and preserving a proper balance and
harmonious working relationship among the three branches of the federal government”).
201
See, e.g., Cook, 288 U.S. at 120 (“A treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified
by a later statute, unless such a purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”); United
States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that the Charming Betsy
“presumption can be overcome only by a clear statement of intent to override international law”).
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only for “some affirmative expression” in the statutory text or legislative
history “of congressional intent to abrogate the United States’ international
obligations.”202 All appear to agree, however, that courts should require at
least some affirmative evidence of congressional intent before construing an
ambiguous statute to violate international law.203
The Charming Betsy canon applies with full force to §§ 1325(a) and
1326.204 The text of these provisions does not specify unambiguously
whether the prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry apply to refugees.205
Nor does the relevant legislative history furnish any affirmative
expression—much less a clear statement—that Congress intended to
penalize refugees for irregular migration.206 Applying Charming Betsy to
these provisions would also advance the canon’s core purpose—preventing
the courts from generating friction with foreign governments and
international organizations207—while also returning the sensitive question of
immigration policy to Congress, where it belongs.208 Accordingly,
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 are precisely the types of ambiguous statutory
provisions that Charming Betsy serves to clarify.209
The case for applying Charming Betsy to the INA is especially
compelling, given Congress’s oft-expressed objective to harmonize federal
immigration law with the United States’ obligations under international law.
Congress adopted early versions of §§ 1325(a) and 1326 decades before
policymakers enshrined special protections for refugees in domestic and

202

Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32.
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814–18 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part) (citing Charming Betsy and “recogniz[ing] the principle that the scope of generally worded
statutes must be construed in light of international law”).
204
The fact that the Refugee Protocol is not self-executing under domestic law makes no difference
in this analysis. Courts routinely use non-self-executing treaties to elucidate the meaning of ambiguous
statutes. See, e.g., Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2009); Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. United
States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343–44 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999). See generally Crootof, supra note 198, at
1801–05 (discussing these and other cases).
205
See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that Charming Betsy
applies only if a statute “employ[s] ambiguous or ‘general’ words”).
206
See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
207
See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)
(emphasizing that the Charming Betsy canon prevents courts from causing “disturbance” and
“embarrassment” to U.S. foreign relations).
208
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“[T]hat the formulation of [immigration] policies
is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”).
209
See generally Khan, 584 F.3d at 783 (explaining that under Charming Betsy a court should
“interpret the INA in such a way as to avoid any conflict with the [Refugee] Protocol, if possible”).
203
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international law.210 When the United States joined the Refugee Protocol in
1968, however, both the President and the Senate approved the treaty on the
understanding that the INA’s criminal prohibitions against illegal entry and
reentry were compatible with the Refugee Protocol.211 And when Congress
revisited the United States’ obligations under international refugee law a
decade later, it enacted the Refugee Act with the express purpose of
eliminating any lingering incongruities between the INA and the Refugee
Protocol.212 The historical record suggests, in other words, that for at least
fifty years Congress has been committed to ensuring that federal immigration
law satisfies the United States’ international obligations. Given this steadfast
legislative commitment to international law compliance, courts have
especially compelling reasons to apply the Charming Betsy canon in this
context.
In the past, the Executive Branch has endorsed the Charming Betsy
canon’s guidance that INA provisions should be interpreted to avoid
conflicts with Article 31. For example, in 1992, INS published a notice of
proposed rulemaking detailing how it intended to implement a newly enacted
INA section that authorized civil penalties for travel document fraud.213
When a commentator expressed concern about the agency potentially
penalizing refugees in violation of the United States’ obligations under the
Refugee Protocol, INS Commissioner Gene McNary agreed that this
objection was “well taken.”214 To address this concern, Commissioner
McNary offered the following pledge:
In order to avoid any conflict with the Convention, the Service will construe the
document fraud penalties as inapplicable to a case in which the only
presentation of the document was pursuant to direct departure from a country
in which the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution or from which there
is a significant danger that the alien would be returned to a country in which the
alien would have a well-founded fear of persecution. The Service will not issue
a Notice of Intent to Fine for any such act of document fraud committed by an
alien prior to the opportunity to present himself or herself without delay to an
210

See text accompanying supra notes 49–74.
See text accompanying supra notes 84–88.
212
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative
history of . . . the entire [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United
States refugee law into conformance with the [Protocol].”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,
178 n.35, 179 (1993) (citing Charming Betsy and using the Protocol as a guide to the interpretation of
domestic refugee law).
213
See Penalties for Document Fraud, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,862, 33,863 (July 31, 1992) (discussing
regulations adopted to implement the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 544, 104 Stat.
4978, 5059–61).
214
Id. at 33,866.
211
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INS officer and to show good cause for his or her illegal entry or presence in
accordance with Article 31(1) of the Convention.215

Although McNary’s interpretation was not directed at §§ 1325(a) or
1326 specifically, his assertion that the INA’s general penalty provisions
should be interpreted to include implicit exceptions for refugees offers a
model for how prosecutors and courts should construe §§ 1325(a) and 1326
today.
Defenders of refugee prosecution might raise at least two objections to
this application of the Charming Betsy canon. First, they might argue that the
Refugee Protocol entrusts the Attorney General with exclusive responsibility
for determining how (or whether) the United States will comply with Article
31.216 Perhaps the reason why the INA does not expressly exempt refugees
from criminal liability is that members of Congress took for granted that,
although refugees were technically liable for illegal entry and reentry, the
DOJ would never actually bring those charges against them. This theory is
plausible in the abstract, but mere plausibility is not enough to rebut the
Charming Betsy canon. Instead, what is needed is actual evidence that
Congress intended to empower federal prosecutors to violate the United
States’ obligations under the Refugee Protocol. No such evidence appears in
the INA’s text or its accompanying legislative history. Accordingly, mere
speculation that Congress might have committed the task of international law
compliance to federal prosecutors does not reflect the kind of “affirmative
expression of congressional intent” that would displace the Charming Betsy
canon’s rebuttable presumption.217
Another possible objection is that the Charming Betsy canon does not
categorically prohibit refugee prosecution, because not all refugees are
within the compass of Article 31. There is some force to this argument. To
enjoy immunity from criminal penalties under Article 31, refugees must
“com[e] directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened,”
“present themselves without delay to the authorities,” and “show good cause
for their illegal entry or presence.”218 Accordingly, refugees lose their
immunity from prosecution under Article 31 if they have received a firm
offer of resettlement elsewhere or unreasonably delayed presenting
215

Id. Consistent with this interpretation, the INS adopted a rule excluding refugees from civil
penalties under these circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 270.2(j) (2009).
216
Cf. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984) (suggesting that the United States was able to
comply with the Refugee Protocol prior to the Refugee Act because “the Attorney General would honor
the requirements of the Protocol” through the exercise of enforcement discretion).
217
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
218
Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 31(1).
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themselves to authorities after crossing into the United States. This objection
only goes so far, however, because it would not apply to the vast majority of
refugees who have been prosecuted in the United States for immigration
crimes, including Central Americans who have traveled through unsafe third
countries where their lives and freedoms would be at risk.219 The Refugee
Convention’s preparatory work confirms that refugees may still claim
immunity from prosecution under Article 31 if the countries through which
they traveled did not make firm offers of “protection or asylum” or
“constituted actual or potential threats to [their] life or freedom.”220 These are
precisely the factors that have driven refugees from Central America to
undertake their perilous journeys to the United States. Thus, the
overwhelming majority of refugees who attempt illegal entry or reentry into
the United States are immune from criminal penalties under Article 31.221
Significantly, the Refugee Convention and Protocol are not the only
international treaties that support exempting refugees from criminal
penalties.222 For instance, the United States is also a party to the 2004
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
(Smuggling Protocol), which prohibits prosecuting migrants who use
smugglers to enter the United States illegally.223 Further, refugee prosecution

219
For discussion of the risks Central American refugees face in transit states, see text accompanying
infra notes 335–357.
220
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, ¶ 28. Significantly, refugees enjoy immunity from criminal
penalties for illegal entry under Article 31(1) without any requirement to show that transit states would
threaten their “life or freedom” on account of their race, religion, or another protected ground. Refugee
Convention, supra note 12, art. 33(1). Instead, “the expression ‘coming directly’ in Article 31(1) covers
the situation of a person who enters . . . from another country where his protection, safety and security
could not be assured [for any reason] . . . [or] who transits an intermediate country for a short period of
time without having applied for, or received, asylum there.” UNHCR, REVISED GUIDELINES ON
APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS ¶ 4 (1999).
221
On July 16, 2019, DOJ and DHS adopted an interim final rule that would disqualify migrants
from receiving asylum if they “fail[ed] to apply for protection from persecution or torture while in a third
country through which they transited en route to the United States.” See Asylum Eligibility and
Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 33,829–30 (July 16, 2019). A challenge to the rule is
currently pending in federal district court. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974
(N.D. Cal. 2019).
222
See CATHRYN COSTELLO, YULIA IOFFE & TERESA BÜCHSEL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, PPLA/2017/01, at 8–10 (UNHCR Legal and
Protection Policy Research Series 2017), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/59ad55c24.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QW5M-FX7K] (discussing the sources in this paragraph).
223
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 5, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507, entered into force
Jan. 2004 (“Migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution . . . for the fact of having been the
object of [illegal smuggling across borders].”). The United States ratified the treaty in 2005. See Protocol
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
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may also violate the United States’ obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other human rights
agreements.224 Human rights treaty bodies have expressed concern that
criminalizing illegal entry “prevent[s] victims from seeking protection,
assistance and justice”225 and therefore “exceeds the legitimate interests of
States in protecting its territories and regulating irregular migration flows.”226
Hence, in addition to violating the Refugee Protocol, the Trump
Administration’s current zero-tolerance policy breaches other international
obligations of the United States.
Of course, had Congress specified clearly and unambiguously that it
intended to punish refugees for illegal entry and reentry, courts could not use
the Charming Betsy canon to frustrate that legislative purpose—even if
Congress’s decision would violate the United States’ obligations under the
Refugee Protocol, the Smuggling Protocol, and the ICCPR. But Congress
has not placed courts in this position. Sections 1325(a) and 1326 do not
expressly target refugees, and the legislative history of the INA and the
Refugee Protocol indicate that members of Congress would have
disapproved of refugee prosecution. Courts should therefore interpret
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 narrowly to avoid violating the United States’
international commitments.227
2. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Constitutional concerns also preclude applying §§ 1325(a) and 1326 to
refugees. In the past, critics of immigration prosecution have raised a host of
constitutional objections to the manner in which federal prosecutors and
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-b&chapter=18&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/ZX3K-QLTS].
224
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes . . . to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . national . . . origin . . . .”).
225
U.N. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Non-Punishment and Non-Prosecution of
Victims of Trafficking in Persons: Administrative and Judicial Approaches to Offences Committed in the
Process of Such Trafficking, at 2–3, U.N. Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2010/4 (Dec. 9, 2009).
226
UNHRC, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det. ¶ 58, A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2008),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/102/94/PDF/G1010294.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/N5K7-ATCC]; see also OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTION
OF
MIGRANTS
13
(Migration
Discussion
Papers),
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/administrativedetentionrev5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24K9-V7HF] (“[D]etention of migrants on the ground of their irregular status should
under no circumstance be of a punitive nature.”).
227
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (concluding that the ICCPR “was not
self-executing” but “does bind the United States as a matter of international law”).
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judges have handled cases involving illegal entry and reentry charges. These
objections have focused primarily on due process concerns related to
Streamline proceedings. In particular, critics have argued that these
proceedings give defendants insufficient time to prepare for expedited
hearings, do not afford adequate access to translation services and legal
counsel, and extract guilty pleas from large groups of defendants en masse.228
What immigrant-rights advocates have overlooked is that refugee
prosecution also violates another constitutional right: the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 229 Courts
would do well, therefore, to interpret §§ 1325(a) and 1326 to avoid this
possible constitutional infirmity.
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man,” the Supreme Court has explained.230 “While the
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards,” as defined by
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”231
Applying these standards, the Court concluded in Trop v. Dulles that
using expatriation—deprivation of citizenship and forced expulsion—as a
criminal penalty would violate the Eighth Amendment.232 The problem with
this practice was that it would effect “the total destruction of the individual’s
status in organized society,” placing “[h]is very existence at the sufferance
of the country in which he happens to find himself.”233
While any one country may accord him some rights, . . . no country need do
so because he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights
of an alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation.
In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the
Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear
228

See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the
indiscriminate shackling of defendants violated constitutional due process), vacated and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) (concluding that the case was moot because the defendants had pleaded guilty);
United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that taking guilty pleas in
large group hearings does not violate the Fifth Amendment); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 5
(“The speed of the trial, lack of access to counsel, and insufficient efforts to overcome language barriers
threaten the right to a fair trial and to effective counsel.”).
229
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
230
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
231
Id. at 100, 101.
232
Id. at 101–03.
233
Id. at 101.
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and distress . . . . He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international
community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous
consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The
threat makes the punishment obnoxious.
The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness
is not to be imposed as punishment for crime . . . . In this country the Eighth
Amendment forbids that to be done.234

Having “no choice but to enforce the paramount commands of the
Constitution,” the Court declared in Trop that expatriation constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.235
Although refugees who face prosecution for entering the United States
illegally do not face expatriation, threatening them with prosecution for
illegal entry or reentry delivers a similarly devastating blow to their “status
in organized society.”236 When refugees are outside their home countries
without a realistic option to return, they are reduced to a status of de facto
statelessness.237 Until refugees receive a firm offer of asylum elsewhere,
punishing them for illegal entry sends the message that they are not welcome
anywhere—that their human rights are at the mercy of domestic law
enforcement agencies and may be disregarded by the agencies for any reason
or no reason at all. If all states were to adopt this approach, refugees’
presence anywhere would constitute an unavoidable trespass.238 It would
mean, in short, that refugees had “lost the right to have rights.”239
Precisely for these reasons, the United States has joined with other
members of the international community to condemn refugee prosecution as
a cruel and inhumane practice. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention reflects
a robust international consensus that penalizing refugees for illegal entry and
234

Id. at 101–03 (citations omitted).
Id. at 104. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan offered a decisive fifth vote in support of the
Court’s holding that expatriation violates the Eighth Amendment. Without expressly rejecting the
plurality’s focus on the Eighth Amendment’s “substantive limits,” Brennan proposed a different
analytical framework for reaching the same conclusion. He asserted that expatriation was unconstitutional
for the separate reason that it was disproportionate to Congress’s legitimate interest in deterring wartime
desertion. Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring).
236
See id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
237
See 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78, 96 (1966).
238
See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 267 (2016) (explaining how this concern underwrites the international
prohibition against refoulement); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 279–80 (2009) (arguing that if all land were privately held and the landless were
denied permission to be anywhere, “they would do wrong simply by being wherever they happened to
be”).
239
Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
235
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reentry is inhumane.240 Both Congress and the Executive Branch have
endorsed Article 31 in the past as a minimum standard of humane treatment
for refugees,241 and the Supreme Court has stressed that international
agreements like the Refugee Convention constitute important benchmarks
for evaluating whether domestic practices satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s
evolving standards of decency.242 Prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and
reentry thus violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.
To be sure, there is an important difference between expatriation (the
practice addressed in Trop) and refugee prosecution: the former is a
constitutionally impermissible method of punishment, while the latter
exceeds the “substantive limits on what [conduct] can be made criminal and
punished as such.”243 This distinction matters because the Supreme Court has
advised that the Eighth Amendment’s substantive limits are “to be applied
sparingly.”244 Courts rarely set aside criminal statutes on the ground that they
overstep the Eighth Amendment’s substantive limits. Even so, a growing
body of federal jurisprudence supports the conclusion that refugee
prosecution violates the Eighth Amendment’s substantive limits.
The conventional starting point for mapping the Eighth Amendment’s
substantive limits is the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision Robinson v.
California.245 At issue in Robinson was a California statute that declared it a
crime to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”246 The Court observed that this
formulation made the mere “‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense,
for which the offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms’”—
even if the offender had never “used or possessed any narcotics within the

240
At present, 149 states are parties to one or both of the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol.
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mt
dsg2&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/ETM9-55E3]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-5&
chapter=5 [https://perma.cc/59TR-8NMQ].
241
See, e.g., Johnson Letter, supra note 85 (endorsing the Refugee Protocol); Senate Protocol Report,
supra note 88 (same).
242
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80–82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577–
78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Trop, 356 U.S. at 102–03. See generally
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1085, 1095–97, 1099–103 (2002) (discussing this principle).
243
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
244
Id.
245
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
246
Id. at 660 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721).
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State.”247 Recognizing that narcotics addiction is “an illness which may be
contracted innocently or involuntarily,” the Court held that punishing a
person based solely on their addictive impulses—without requiring any overt
acts—would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.248
A few years later, in Powell v. Texas,249 the Court evaluated a Texas
statute that criminalized “get[ting] drunk or be[ing] found in a state of
intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own.”250
This time, the Justices divided over the proper application of the Eighth
Amendment. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall,
four Justices distinguished Robinson, asserting that the Texas statute could
withstand constitutional scrutiny because it criminalized “public behavior,”
not “mere status” or “an irresistible compulsion” that the defendant was
“utterly unable to control.”251 A separate plurality of four Justices dissented
on the grounds that the Texas statute reflected the same “essential
constitutional defect” as the California statute in Robinson: both criminalized
“a condition which [the offender] ha[s] no capacity to change or avoid.”252
The decisive fifth vote in favor of the statute’s constitutionality came
from Justice Byron White. Although White concurred in the result favored
by Marshall, he disagreed with much of Marshall’s analysis. “If it cannot be
a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics,” White reasoned,
then it must also be unconstitutional for a state to make it “a crime to yield
to such a compulsion.”253 Thus, White endorsed the Marshall plurality’s
holding only on the more limited basis that the defendant could have taken
steps to avoid “the act of going to or being in a public place” while
inebriated.254
Crucially, Justice White took pains to distinguish scenarios in which
homeless defendants would have nowhere to consume alcohol other than in
public. In White’s view, homeless alcoholics would have a valid
constitutional defense to prosecution if they “have no place else to go and no
place else to be when they are drinking.”255 Accordingly, if “resisting
drunkenness is impossible” for some defendants due to their addiction, and
if “avoiding public places when intoxicated is also impossible” due to the
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
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Id. at 666.
Id. at 667.
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Id. at 517 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE art. 477 (1952)).
Id. at 532, 535.
Id. at 567–68 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
Id. at 551.
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defendants’ homeless position, then the Texas statute would impermissibly
target involuntary conduct in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 256
As foreshadowed by Justice White’s concurrence, lower federal courts
have looked to Robinson and Powell for guidance when reviewing criminal
laws that target the homeless.257 Consistent with Justice White’s view, most
lower courts have held that a state cannot “expressly criminalize the status
of homelessness by making it a crime to be homeless without violating the
Eighth Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect of
that status” (i.e., sleeping, lying, or eating in public spaces)258 unless it also
furnishes spaces where the homeless can perform these basic life functions
off the streets.259 “As long as the homeless . . . do not have a single place
where they can lawfully be,” statutes that criminalize “sleeping, eating and
other innocent conduct” “effectively punish them for something for which
they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment.” 260
These cases offer important lessons for criminal laws that target
refugees. As the Supreme Court has recognized, refugees are “the world’s
homeless people.”261 Their homelessness is generated by factors beyond their
personal control: individualized threats to their “life or freedom” in their
country of origin.262 Moreover, these threats are based on aspects of refugees’
social status that are either outside their control or that the state may not
legitimately require them to change—i.e., their “race, religion, nationality,
256

Id.
See Sara K. Rankin, Punishing Homelessness, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 99 (2019) (discussing these
developments); Hannah Kieschnick, Note, A Cruel and Unusual Way to Regulate the Homeless:
Extending the Status Crimes Distinction to Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1569 (2018)
(same).
258
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006).
259
See, e.g., id. at 1132–36; Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public
property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (mem.);
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“As long as the homeless plaintiffs
do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances . . . effectively punish
them for something for which they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment—sleeping,
eating and other innocent conduct.”). But see, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (declining to apply the Eighth Amendment as a substantive limit on criminal laws that target
the homeless based, in part, on the conclusion that homelessness is not a “status”).
260
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565. Under the Obama Administration, the DOJ supported this
application of the Eighth Amendment. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Bell v. City of
Boise, No. 1:09-cv-00540-REB (D. Idaho Aug. 6, 2015), ECF No. 276, https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/
761211/download [https://perma.cc/3DGS-DHN6] (asserting that when “sufficient shelter space is
unavailable,” enforcing criminal ordinances against sleeping in public spaces “amounts to the
criminalization of homelessness, in violation of the Eighth Amendment”).
261
Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971).
262
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
257
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”263 For a
refugee, crossing an international border in pursuit of protection is therefore
just as essential to her life and freedom as eating or sleeping in public is to a
homeless person. In both contexts, criminal laws compel people, due to their
vulnerable social status, to either accept unconscionable deprivations of their
life or freedom (e.g., starvation, persecution) or commit otherwise innocent
acts to escape those deprivations (e.g., eat in public, cross a border).264 As
lower courts have held in homeless cases, the Eighth Amendment rescues
people from this dilemma by invalidating laws like these that punish people
for acts that are inextricably linked to their social status.265 Accordingly, to
the extent that compliance with §§ 1325(a) and 1326 would prevent refugees
from accessing refuge from persecution, penalties imposed under these
provisions may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
There are important limits to this Eighth Amendment defense. In
homeless cases, courts have held that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit municipalities from penalizing eating or sleeping in public if
municipalities furnish dining halls and shelters where the homeless may
perform these acts.266 It is only when municipalities do not offer these
accommodations that defendants may invoke the Eighth Amendment
successfully as a defense to prosecution under vagrancy laws. Following the
logic of these decisions, refugees likely cannot invoke the Eighth
Amendment as a defense to prosecution for illegal entry or reentry unless an
illegal border crossing is the only option reasonably available to them to
protect their life or freedom. To satisfy this burden, a refugee would have to
show that illegal entry or reentry was necessary because she could not

263

Id.; accord Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(A)(2).
See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565 (observing that for the homeless “the lack of reasonable
alternatives should not be mistaken for choice”).
265
See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 617 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[J]ust as the state may not
criminalize the state of being ‘homeless in public places,’ the state may not ‘criminalize conduct that is
an unavoidable consequence of being homeless—namely sitting, lying, or sleeping on the streets.’”
(quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006))); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at
1565 (“As long as the homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the
challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them for something for which they may not
be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment—sleeping, eating and other innocent conduct.”).
266
See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying relief under the Eighth
Amendment because Orlando’s “homeless shelter . . . has never reached its maximum capacity and . . .
no individual has been turned away because there was no space available or for failure to pay the one
dollar nightly fee”); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1167 (Cal. 1995) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge on the ground that “it is far from clear that [the defendants] had alternatives to
either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations”).
264
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reasonably obtain timely relief through an authorized port of entry.267 A
refugee might also have to show that other countries through which she
traveled en route to the United States would not guarantee her safety.268 For
those who satisfy these requirements, however, imposing criminal penalties
under §§ 1325(a) or 1326 would violate the Eighth Amendment.
Some might question whether extending the Eighth Amendment to
refugees in this manner stretches Robinson too far. Perhaps the Eighth
Amendment’s substantive limits should prohibit only pure status crimes and
crimes that target irresistible compulsions, not those that address acts like
border crossings, which people perform deliberately, albeit under threat of
grave harm.269 In my view, this is not the most faithful reading of Powell,
given the limiting principles articulated in Justice White’s pivotal concurring
opinion. Nor would this distinction be reasonable as applied to refugees,
given that fleeing persecution is inextricably intertwined with refugee status.
Yet, taking into consideration that none of the Justices who participated in
Robinson and Powell remain on the Court today, it is impossible to rule out
the possibility that the Court might eventually rein in the Eighth
Amendment’s substantive limits in a way that would exclude refugees from
constitutional protection.
Despite these grounds for caution, the better view is that prosecuting
refugees for illegal entry and reentry may, in fact, constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. To uphold refugee prosecution, federal courts would
have to take several audacious steps. First, they would have to disregard the
fact that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry offends
contemporary standards of decency enshrined in multilateral agreements to
which the United States is a party, including the Refugee Protocol, the
ICCPR, and the Smuggling Protocol. Second, they would have to reject the
267
This is not far-fetched. Between 2018 and 2020, DHS adopted measures that made it nearly
impossible for refugees to obtain protection through ports of entry along the U.S.–Mexico border, thereby
driving asylum-seekers to attempt hazardous crossings at unauthorized points along the border. I discuss
these measures in Section III.B.1. Although not discussed in this Article, in recent months, U.S. ports of
entry have essentially closed their doors to refugees in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Press
Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., USCIS Preparing to Resume Public Services on June 4 (May
27,
2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-preparing-resume-public-services-june-4
[https://perma.cc/ABT3-K3LT] (noting “some domestic offices” will reopen but “offices will reduce the
number of appointments and interviews”); Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., USCIS
Temporary Office Closure Extended Until at Least May 3 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/
alerts/uscis-temporary-office-closure-extended-until-least-may-3 [https://perma.cc/EB98-J9DG].
268
In Section III.B.1, I explain why it is ordinarily unreasonable to expect asylum-seekers from
Central America to pursue relief in transit states.
269
See Kieschnick, supra note 257, at 1579–91 (observing that a few lower courts have drawn these
distinctions in domestic homelessness cases); cf. United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 862–63 (9th
Cir. 1994) (declaring that illegal entry by a nonrefugee migrant “cannot be categorized as a status crime”).

765

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

conclusion endorsed by the Powell majority that individuals cannot
constitutionally face punishment for acts compelled by forces beyond their
control. Third, they would have to disavow Trop’s guidance regarding the
unconstitutional cruelty of consigning people to statelessness. Although
refugees are not “stateless” in a formal sense, the fact that they cannot return
safely to their home countries means that they experience de facto
statelessness—a similarly dire “fate of ever-increasing fear and distress” that
is “deplored [by] the international community.”270 For all of these reasons,
federal courts should hold that the Eighth Amendment does not permit courts
to punish refugees—the world’s homeless people—for entering the United
States to preserve their lives and basic freedoms.271
Defenders of refugee prosecution might try to argue in the alternative
that the Eighth Amendment does not limit Congress’s plenary power to
regulate immigration,272 but this argument would have little merit. Although
the Eighth Amendment does not constrain Congress’s power relative to the
administrative detention and removal of foreign nationals,273 ordinary
constitutional constraints apply whenever Congress imposes criminal
sanctions on foreign migrants, including those related to illegal entry and
reentry charges.274 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment applies with full
force to the criminal penalties associated with §§ 1325(a) and 1326.

270

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958).
Skeptics might argue that the availability of relief at official ports of entry undermines these
Eighth Amendment arguments. In Section III.A, I explain why the nominal availability of relief at ports
of entry is inadequate to afford meaningful relief to many refugees—particularly in light of DHS’s recent
efforts to prevent refugees from accessing U.S. soil through ports of entry.
272
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the admission of
aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touching as it does basic aspects of national
sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations and the national security.”); United States v.
Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]t no time during the last century has any
court questioned . . . Congress’s prerogative to enact criminal immigration laws.”).
273
See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 924 F.3d 164, 170 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting
defendants’ Eighth Amendment claims because “they ha[d] not shown that deportation was caused by
their § 1325(a) convictions”); Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1388 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he non-penal
nature of Congress’ plenary power to enumerate and enforce deportable offenses does not permit us to
use the Eighth Amendment as a basis for setting aside the deportation order.”); Calderon-Rodriguez v.
Wilcox, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1037–38 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not apply to immigration detention). See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)
(“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a
criminal procedure.”).
274
See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–39 (1987) (holding that constitutional
due process applies to prosecutions under § 1326); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38
(1896) (holding that when Congress “declare[s] unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous
crime,” ordinary constitutional constraints on criminal punishment apply).
271
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Should courts prefer to sidestep these delicate constitutional questions,
the canon of constitutional avoidance offers a possible alternative solution.275
Rather than resolve the Eighth Amendment issue on the merits, courts could
instead construe §§ 1325(a) and 1326 to avoid this problem by holding that
the provisions do not apply to refugees. Given that refugee prosecution so
clearly offends contemporary standards of decency, as reflected in the
Refugee Protocol, courts would do well to avoid attributing this meaning to
the INA’s ambiguous text in the absence of a crystal-clear directive from
Congress.276 Thus, whether applied directly on the merits or indirectly via the
canon of constitutional avoidance, the Eighth Amendment bolsters the
conclusion that the federal government may not prosecute refugees for illegal
entry or reentry.
3. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity further confirms that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 do not
apply to refugees. Under the rule of lenity, courts must interpret ambiguous
criminal statutes “in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”277 When a
criminal statute can sustain more than one interpretation after courts have
exhausted other traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the rule of lenity
directs courts to choose the narrower interpretation.278 Thus, if “reasonable
doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to ‘the
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the
statute,” the proper course is to decide the interpretive question in the
defendant’s favor.279
275
See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (“A statute must be construed, if
fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon
that score.”). See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (applying the canon of constitutional
avoidance to another provision of the INA); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (observing that the canon on constitutional avoidance “has for
so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate”). But see Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P.
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109,
2163 (2015) (arguing that courts should eschew constitutional avoidance when they “articulate new
constitutional norms”).
276
Cf. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (avoiding grave constitutional
questions through interpretation).
277
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
278
See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952) (“[W]hen choice
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before
we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear
and definite.”).
279
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S.
381, 387 (1980)); see also Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 224 (applying lenity to a case where
“the history of [a statute] and the inexplicitness of its language” did not render its meaning “decisively
clear on its face one way or the other”).
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The rule of lenity serves several purposes in American criminal law.280
First, it safeguards legislative supremacy and promotes legislative
accountability by ensuring that Congress takes responsibility for defining
federal crimes.281 Second, it promotes the rule of law by confirming that
federal statutes give the public adequate notice about what conduct is
criminal.282 Third, it constrains prosecutorial discretion to “minimize the risk
of selective or arbitrary enforcement.”283
The Supreme Court has also applied the rule of lenity outside the
criminal context when interpreting federal immigration law. Recognizing
that “the stakes are considerable for” foreign nationals in removal
proceedings, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Executive and
Judicial Branches must “not assume that Congress meant to trench on [a
foreign national’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest
of several possible meanings of the words used.”284 According to the Court,
lenity is warranted in these contexts based, at least in part, on the fact that
noncitizens “cannot vote” in federal elections and therefore are “particularly
vulnerable to adverse legislation.”285 Thus, in addition to the concerns about
legislative supremacy, notice, and arbitrary enforcement, the fact that foreign
280

See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“[The rule of lenity] is founded on . . . the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court,
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”). See generally Price, supra note 44, at 887
(emphasizing the role of lenity in “advancing the democratic accountability of criminal justice”).
282
See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“Although it is not likely that a criminal
will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed.”).
283
Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
284
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001)
(underscoring “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes
in favor of the alien” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987))). The Court has
indicated, in particular, that the rule of lenity applies to provisions of the INA that govern eligibility for
asylum and other forms of relief from removal. See, e.g., id. at 321; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449;
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966).
285
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 & n.39 (paraphrasing with approval the argument in Stephen H.
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2000)); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (2002) (drawing links between
this rationale and the Supreme Court’s theory advanced in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (explaining that legislative targeting of “discrete and insular
minorities . . . may call for a . . . more searching judicial inquiry”)); Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration
Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 552, 552 n.34 (2003) (same).
281
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nationals are a politically disenfranchised “discrete and insular minority”
offers an important justification for applying the rule of lenity to ambiguous
statutes that target foreigners for special criminal sanctions.286
Applying the rule of lenity to §§ 1325(a) and 1326 makes good sense,
given the many compelling reasons courts have to doubt whether refugee
prosecution would comport with Congress’s legislative plan. Although
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 do not expressly mention refugees, the broader text,
purpose, and legislative history of the INA indicate that Congress did not
envision—and would not have approved—applying these provisions to
refugees. Considered alongside the Charming Betsy canon and the canon of
constitutional avoidance, these factors are amply sufficient to generate
“reasonable doubt” as to whether prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and
reentry would be compatible with Congress’s statutory plan for immigration
and border control. Accordingly, the rule of lenity dictates that any residual
ambiguity in §§ 1325(a) and 1326 must be resolved in favor of refugee
defendants.
C. Synthesis and Recommendations
In sum, this Part has shown that the current conventional wisdom about
refugee prosecution is wrong: the INA does not expose refugees to criminal
penalties for illegal entry and reentry. Although § 1325(a) is cast in
seemingly absolute terms, the full text, purpose, and legislative history of the
INA strongly suggest that this provision does not apply to refugees. The case
for refugee immunity is even stronger under § 1326, which expressly
exempts those who are “not required to obtain [the Attorney General’s]
advance consent” to admission—a category that arguably includes
refugees.287 In addition, three well-established principles of federal statutory
interpretation—the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on constitutional
avoidance, and the rule of lenity—lend powerful support for interpreting
both sections to exclude refugees from criminal liability. Courts would do
well, therefore, to recognize that refugees are not subject to criminal
penalties for illegal entry or reentry.
This conclusion has sweeping implications for American criminal
justice.288 In particular, it suggests that DHS should abandon its recent

286
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a
‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” (citations
omitted)).
287
8 U.S.C. § 1326.
288
In the paragraphs that follow, I endorse several recommendations from Human Rights First’s
excellent January 2018 report, Punishing Refugees and Migrants: The Trump Administration’s Misuse of
Criminal Prosecutions. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 6–7.
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practice of referring asylum-seekers for criminal prosecution immediately
following their apprehension. Instead, DHS should restore its time-honored
practice of referring asylum-seekers for credible fear interviews before
asylum officers, thereby enabling refugees to seek relief in immigration court
first. Federal prosecutors, in turn, should refrain from bringing criminal
charges until after an asylum officer or immigration judge has made a final
determination that an asylum-seeker does not qualify as a genuine refugee.
If the Executive Branch refuses to abandon its zero-tolerance policy, federal
courts should confirm that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 do not apply to refugees and
require prosecutors to allow asylum-seekers to petition for relief through the
immigration process before initiating criminal charges.
Sequencing immigration proceedings before criminal trials in this
manner is essential to protect refugees from unwarranted convictions and
due process violations.289 Federal courts are poorly equipped to make refugee
status determinations by virtue of their distinctive procedures. This is
obviously true for Streamline proceedings that combine a defendant’s initial
appearance, arraignment, plea, and sentencing in a single expedited hearing
before a magistrate judge.290 These expedited proceedings are not designed
to handle the fact-intensive inquiries that arise in refugee status
determinations, which often entail significant witness testimony and
documentary evidence. Moreover, it is no less true for ordinary criminal
cases before federal district judges. Because refugees usually have limited
access to evidence other than their own personal testimony, most are forced
to rely on hearsay statements that would be admissible in immigration
court291 but not in a federal district court.292 Requiring asylum-seekers to
establish the factual basis for their refugee status in federal district court
would therefore deprive many refugees of a full and fair opportunity to
289
See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, ¶ 4 (“In most cases, only if an individual’s claim to refugee
status is examined before he or she is affected by an exercise of State jurisdiction (for example, in regard
to penalization for ‘illegal’ entry), can the State be sure that its international obligations are met.”).
290
See Sklansky, supra note 64, at 169–70.
291
See In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (B.I.A. 1984) (“It is well established that the strict
rules of evidence are not applicable in deportation proceedings.”).
292
See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”); UNHCR, HANDBOOK
AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 197 (2d ed. 1992,
2011 reissue), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html [https://perma.cc/24QQ-272E] (“The
requirement of evidence should . . . not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent
in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.”); Puhl, supra note 126, at
103 (observing that applying the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings “eliminates a large portion of
evidence that is used to prove asylum cases, which frequently rely only on hearsay testimony by the
asylum seeker herself”).
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mount an effective defense to prosecution, in violation of their constitutional
right to due process and the United States’ international obligations.293 Due
process concerns dictate, therefore, that DHS must allow asylum-seekers to
establish their refugee status in immigration court before DOJ pursues
criminal charges based on illegal entry or reentry.294
Allowing immigration proceedings to conclude before prosecutors
bring criminal charges is also necessary to respect Congress’s statutory plan
for refugee status determinations. The INA entrusts refugee status
determinations to immigration courts, not federal district courts, in the first
instance.295 The best way to respect this legislative choice, while preserving
asylum-seekers’ right to invoke their refugee status as a defense to criminal
liability, is for prosecutors to wait to decide whether to bring charges under
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 until after an asylum officer or immigration judge has
determined whether foreign migrants are bona fide refugees.
Once prosecutors and courts recognize that refugees are not criminally
liable for illegal entry and reentry, they will have to work through the
implications of this conclusion for pending cases and past convictions.
Refugees with convictions that are still pending should be able to invoke
their actual innocence as a defense on appeal.296 Whether courts may
entertain requests to vacate convictions that have already become final is less

293
See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837 (1987) (holding that constitutional due
process applies to prosecutions under § 1326); United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1042–43
(9th Cir. 2012) (same).
294
A refugee should not be precluded from collaterally challenging a negative status determination
reached in immigration court, however, if “(1) [she has] exhausted any administrative remedies that may
have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the [removal] proceedings . . . improperly deprived
[her] of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.”
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S at 839 (“Depriving an alien of the right to have the
disposition in a deportation hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be
made available in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used to
establish an element of a criminal offense.”).
295
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this
section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the
United States . . . .”); see also United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1988) (“A
criminal trial for the felony of illegal reentry . . . is not the proper forum to argue a case for political
asylum.”). Further evidence of Congress’s expectation that immigration proceedings would precede
criminal proceedings can be found in § 1326 itself, which limits the circumstances under which criminal
defendants may use criminal proceedings to challenge the validity of a deportation order. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(d).
296
Cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding “that a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review or not yet
final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”).
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clear but merits further study.297 It might well be an abuse of discretion for
the Attorney General to rely on past convictions under §§ 1325(a) and 1326
as grounds for denying refugees’ petitions for asylum or other discretionary
relief. Although this Article does not afford the space necessary to sort
through all of these complexities, the scope of the challenge ahead
underscores the need for an expeditious course correction.
III. IS PROSECUTING REFUGEES MORALLY DEFENSIBLE?
This Part bolsters the case against prosecuting refugees by explaining
why the international community, members of Congress, and (until recently)
federal prosecutors have rejected the practice as immoral. Advocates of
restrictive immigration policies might find this idea counterintuitive. What
is so wrong, some might ask, with using criminal penalties to establish an
orderly process for admitting refugees and screening out other irregular
migrants? Doesn’t the United States have a legitimate sovereign interest in
securing its borders and enforcing its law?
In this Part, I argue that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and illegal
reentry may be unconscionable for several reasons. First, prosecution is
immoral when a refugee’s decision to obviate U.S. border controls is
objectively justified based on her well-founded fear of persecution abroad.
Second, even if violating U.S. border controls is not objectively justified, an
illegal entry may be morally excused based on a refugee’s subjective fear of
mistreatment or other individualized factors. Third, the United States’
current approach to prosecuting refugees is inconsistent with the rule of law
as a moral ideal. Fourth, the way that the United States handles criminal
cases at the U.S.–Mexico border is morally indefensible because it often
prevents refugees from accessing asylum and withholding of removal,
thereby exposing refugees to persecution abroad. Thus, the factors that
support refugee prosecution are manifestly outweighed by countervailing
moral considerations.
To be clear, I do not argue here that the United States could never
morally prosecute refugees for violating domestic border controls under any
circumstances. My claim is narrower—namely, that the United States’ recent
approach to refugee prosecution is morally indefensible.298 By preventing all

297
See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922,
925 (2006) (“Under current law, no serious problems are posed by cases in which a defendant’s conviction
has become ‘final’ before the law-changing decision was announced . . . .”); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 87–89 (1977) (establishing a “contemporaneous-objection rule” to limit federal habeas
review for issues that defendants failed to raise in state criminal proceedings).
298
As noted previously, this Part does not address the unique moral considerations and domestic
regulatory responses associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
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but a tiny fraction of refugees from accessing relief through legal channels,
the United States has undermined its moral authority to prosecute asylumseekers who enter without inspection. The United States cannot have it both
ways; it cannot in good conscience prevent refugees from accessing its
territory through official ports of entry while simultaneously prosecuting
those who enter elsewhere. This moral assessment has important legal
consequences, because it strengthens the case for concluding that refugees
have valid defenses to prosecution under the Eighth Amendment and federal
common law.299
A few additional provisos are necessary at the outset. For purposes of
the present discussion, I assume that states have morally compelling reasons
to regulate migration across their borders through civil and administrative
law, including for the purpose of safeguarding their national security. 300 I also
assume arguendo that the United States’ criminal prohibitions on illegal
entry and reentry are necessary to punish and deter unauthorized immigration
by nonrefugee migrants.301 Yet, even if both of these assumptions hold true,
it still does not follow that the federal government can morally prosecute
refugees who enter U.S. territory without inspection. As long as the United
States prevents needy refugees from accessing protection through legally
prescribed channels, it is immoral for the federal government to punish
refugees who pursue refuge in the United States through irregular
channels.302
A. The Conventional Case for Prosecution
Although the Executive Branch has not offered a robust moral
justification for refugee prosecution, its reasons for embracing this policy
can be deduced from a patchwork of sources, including CBP’s response to
the DHS Inspector General’s report and arguments that federal prosecutors
have advanced in criminal cases. The primary rationale appears to be that
prosecution is necessary to establish an orderly and efficient process for

299
In particular, this Part reinforces the conclusion that refugee prosecution violates the Eighth
Amendment, see supra Section II.C, and that refugees may present successful necessity and duress
defenses to criminal liability, see infra Section III.D.
300
Accordingly, this Part does not address the morality of civil and administrative enforcement
measures, such as deportation.
301
For a general introduction to the legal and policy issues surrounding border criminalization, see
Eagly, supra note 62.
302
This Part does not address whether the United States may morally prosecute forced migrants who
do not qualify as “refugees” under international and domestic law—including those displaced by civil
unrest, famine, and environmental catastrophe. I hope to take up this question in future work.
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admitting bona fide refugees while screening out asylum-seekers with
baseless claims.303
This argument is plausible enough on its face. Every sovereign state has
a legitimate interest in protecting its national security and conserving its
limited administrative resources. To this end, criminalizing illegal entry and
reentry demarcates a clear “baseline of desired conduct” that the United
States can use to channel asylum-seekers into orderly screening processes.304
For example, refugees may apply for the United States’ overseas refugee
resettlement program305 or request permission to travel to the United States
through an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa program.306 Those who reach the
United States’ territorial borders may apply for relief at official ports of
entry.307 Using criminal law to incentivize participation in these orderly
screening processes should enable the federal government to screen out
asylum-seekers who are not refugees, as well as refugees who do not qualify
for admission because they would endanger U.S. national security.308 An
orderly admissions process could also empower DHS and DOJ to conserve
administrative resources by concentrating asylum officers and immigration
judges at designated ports of entry, freeing Border Patrol agents to focus their
attention on apprehending and removing other foreign nationals who attempt
to enter U.S. territory without authorization. Without question, these are
significant governmental interests.
303
See INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 31–32 (stressing the need for orderly processing of
criminal and administrative matters); Jessica Zhang & Andrew Patterson, The Most Prosecuted Federal
Offense in America: A Primer on the Criminalization of Border Crossing, LAWFARE (July 25, 2019, 8:41
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/most-prosecuted-federal-offense-america-primer-criminalizationborder-crossing [https://perma.cc/BR68-VJMV] (“Opponents of decriminalization . . . [emphasize] the
meaning of sovereignty, international borders and the rule of law.”).
304
Juliette Kayyem, Decriminalizing the Border Is Not in Anyone’s Interest, WASH. POST (July 2,
2019, 12:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/decriminalizing-the-border-is-not-inanyones-interest/2019/07/01/27292360-9c36-11e9-85d6-5211733f92c7_story.html [https://perma.cc/
T6C7-8ZDY].
305
See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: Overseas Application and Case Processing, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, & MIGRATION, https://www.state.gov/refugeeadmissions/application-and-case-processing/ [https://perma.cc/Z677-WVND] (discussing overseas
refugee resettlement).
306
See U.S. Visas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas.html [https://perma.cc/BJ7G-XR7Y] (offering an
overview of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa programs).
307
See INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 32 (defending illegal reentry prosecution on the
ground that a refugee “always has the option of presenting themselves at the port of entry to make their
claim”).
308
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (permitting U.S. officials to exclude or deport refugees who have
engaged in persecution, committed certain serious crimes, or otherwise pose “a danger to the security of
the United States”).
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B. Exculpating Factors
Notwithstanding these facially reasonable grounds for prosecuting
refugees for illegal entry and reentry, there are a variety of important reasons
why the threats that refugees face in their home countries should exculpate
them from criminal liability. For ease of analysis, these exculpating
considerations can be divided into two categories: justifications and excuses.
These exculpating considerations clarify why U.S. lawmakers would exempt
refugees from criminal penalties for illegal entry and reentry in the Refugee
Protocol and the INA. As will become apparent later in this Part, these
considerations also suggest that courts should allow refugees to raise
common law defenses to prosecution under §§ 1325(a) and 1326.309
1. Justifications
In the moral philosophy of criminal law, justifications involve
situations where a person’s actions are morally warranted, despite the fact
that they violate positive law. A legal violation is justified in this sense if it
is morally appropriate, all things considered.310 Justifications focus on the
moral propriety of acts as such, not the volition or intentions of particular
actors.
Legal theorists have offered competing philosophical theories to
explain why criminal acts may be morally justified in this sense.
Retributivists consider an act justified if legal sanctions would be
“undeserved,” taking into account all relevant moral considerations.311 In
contrast, utilitarians consider an act justified if it produces “consequences
that are, on balance, socially desirable.”312 Under both theories, the fact that
an act violates positive law may be an important factor weighing against the
conclusion that it is morally justified, but an unlawful act may nonetheless
be justified if it is supported by substantial, countervailing moral
considerations.
309

See infra Section III.D.
Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89,
89–91 (1986).
311
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 943 (1978) (“An inference from the
wrongful act to the actor’s character is essential to a retributive theory of punishment.”); JOHN GARDNER,
In Defence of Defences, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 77, 77 (2007) (asserting that both utilitarians and retributivists, such as Immanuel Kant,
accept that the idea that an act is not “wrong unless it is wrong all things considered, i.e., taking into
account of both the reasons in favour of performing it (the pros) and the reasons against performing it
(the cons)”); Kent Greenawalt, “Uncontrollable” Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of
Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 953 (1969) (observing that for retributivists, punishment is
wrong if “undeserved”).
312
Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 938.
310
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A classic example of a justified crime is a hiker who, having lost her
way in the wilderness, steals food from an uninhabited cabin to ward off
starvation.313 Although the hiker commits a crime by stealing food, few
would dispute that her act is justified under the circumstances. Retributivists
would consider punishment undeserved in this scenario because the law
could not reasonably fault the starving hiker for taking prudent steps to
preserve life. Likewise, utilitarians would accept that the hiker’s decision to
steal food, rather than perish from starvation, achieves the best overall
outcome for society.314 Accordingly, courts and legal scholars have accepted
without controversy that the starving hiker’s criminal act is justified—and,
therefore, exculpated—in light of her exigent circumstances.315
The same logic of moral justification is implicit in Article 31 of the
Refugee Convention. Article 31 was designed to prevent states–parties from
placing refugees in the untenable position of having to choose between
persecution in their home countries and criminal sanctions in countries where
they seek asylum.316 By prohibiting states from prosecuting refugees for
ordinary immigration crimes, the Refugee Convention recognizes that
refugees have sound moral justifications for violating domestic immigration
controls. This is obviously true from a retributivist perspective, because a
state cannot reasonably blame a refugee for crossing its borders illegally
when this step is necessary to prevent death, torture, or other serious harm.
It is no less true when viewed from a utilitarian perspective—violating U.S.
border controls is clearly the lesser evil when compared with the serious
threats that await refugees abroad. Moreover, the utilitarian argument for
refugee prosecution is particularly weak given that DHS itself recognizes
that the threat of criminal sanctions does not actually deter refugees from
attempting illegal entry and reentry.317
Some might object that prosecuting refugees could advance social
welfare by deterring immigration crimes by nonrefugee migrants. This
conjecture is suspect, to say the least. Opponents of the criminalization of
immigration enforcement contend that there is no reliable evidence that

313
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1205–06, 1229 (1985).
314
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1998).
315
See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson & Darley, supra
note 314, at 1097; Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 258 (1987).
316
See WEIS, supra note 83, art. 31, ¶¶ 1–4, at 201–03 (discussing this principle).
317
See DHS STATISTICS, supra note 10, at 16 (describing asylum-seekers as “‘non-impactable’ by
traditional enforcement policies”).
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criminal penalties deter migrants from entering the United States,318 let alone
that refugee prosecution influences whether nonrefugee migrants do so. But
even if refugee prosecution has some general deterrent effect on nonrefugee
migrants, its marginal contribution is likely exceedingly small. There simply
is no good reason to think that prosecuting refugees makes such a significant
contribution to general deterrence that it would outweigh the countervailing
social costs of refugee prosecution and incarceration.
More fundamentally, the general deterrence argument for refugee
protection overlooks the salience of blameworthiness in moral justification.
Criminal law theorists of all stripes tend to agree that public authorities must
not punish a person whose conduct is otherwise blameless solely for the
purpose of deterring others.319 Although utilitarians do not accept the
retributivist thesis that blameworthiness is a sufficient condition for criminal
liability, most agree that it is a necessary condition for legitimate criminal
penalties.320 If this conventional wisdom is correct, and if I am right that
refugees are morally blameless for committing immigration crimes in order
to access relief from persecution, then the general deterrence argument for
refugee prosecution collapses, as the necessary condition of
blameworthiness is absent.
A more serious argument against regarding refugee status as a moral
justification for illegal entry or reentry is that irregular migration into the
United States might not be strictly necessary to avoid the threat of
persecution abroad. If a refugee could indeed avoid persecution without
violating U.S. immigration controls, then it would be much harder to argue
that her illegal entry or reentry was a morally appropriate action, all things
considered. In particular, defenders of refugee prosecution might object that
unauthorized border crossings are not strictly necessary to secure protection
in the United States for two reasons: (1) refugees can access protection in the
United States without committing immigration crimes, and (2) refugees can
access protection in other countries without entering the United States.
Neither of the arguments can withstand close scrutiny because they are
based on mistaken assumptions about refugees’ options. In the real world,
refugees who enter the United States outside an official port of entry

318
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 26–27 (observing that some federal agencies have
called into question whether prosecuting unauthorized migrants for illegal entry and reentry moves the
needle on deterring unauthorized migration); Keller, supra note 110, at 137 (concluding that “there is
simply no evidence that the government is meaningfully deterring illegal immigration by prosecuting
illegal entry and re-entry cases”).
319
See Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 939–40.
320
See id.
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typically do so only as a last resort, having no other realistic options for
obtaining a safe refuge from persecution.
Consider first the argument that refugees can access protection in the
United States without committing immigration crimes. While it is true that
the United States does offer protection to some refugees through ordinary
admissions processes, for the vast majority of refugees around the world
these avenues for relief are chimerical. Only a tiny percentage of the twentysix million refugees worldwide receive offers to resettle outside their home
countries.321 In the period since President Trump took office in January 2017
through September 2019, the United States admitted approximately 76,200
refugees through its overseas refugee resettlement program, 322 and the
administration has announced plans to cut admissions even further to a
maximum of 18,000 in 2020.323 Typically, refugees who are not accepted into
the overseas refugee resettlement program have no other lawful avenue to
access refuge in the United States. Most can reach an official U.S. port of
entry only by air or sea, but they cannot board a commercial airplane or ship
bound for the United States without a passport and visa.324 Due to the perilous
circumstances that drive their flight, refugees often lack passports from their
home country.325 To make matters worse, Congress has not established an
immigrant visa program for refugees, and the State Department routinely
denies temporary visitor visas to foreign nationals who reveal that they are
seeking refuge from persecution.326 Hence, even when refugees have time
321

In 2019, only 107,800 out of twenty-six million refugees were resettled. Figures at a Glance,
UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/J67E-2GAL].
322
Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/13/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/
[https://
perma.cc/6AU4-MA9X].
323
See Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump Slashes Refugee Cap to 18,000, Curtailing
U.S. Role as Haven, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us/
politics/trump-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/A3GQ-3XM2].
324
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 273.1–6 (2020) (specifying the procedures carriers must employ to screen
passengers, promulgated under 8 U.S.C. § 1323 (specifying that it is unlawful for any carrier to bring to
the United States any alien who does not have authorization to enter the United States)).
325
See Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove, The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law,
9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 189 (1996) (“The purpose of Article 31 is to recognize in international law
that refugees, owing to their hostile relations with their own governments, may be unable to obtain normal
immigration documents and may resort to extra-legal measures in order to flee persecution and seek
asylum.”).
326
See DAVID A. MARTIN, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN
FULLERTON, FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 593 (1st ed. 2007) (noting that “the refugee
definition is not a basis for receiving a U.S. visa” and that “U.S. law bars the issuance of a nonimmigrant
visa in the most widely used categories . . . if there are indications that the person intends, for any reason
to abandon his or her foreign residence” (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
§ 101(a)(15)(B), (F), 66 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1952))).
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and resources to apply for visas, their chances of success are vanishingly
slim. Cumulatively, these legal and practical constraints prevent the vast
majority of refugees from accessing protection through the United States’
orderly admissions process. Most refugees therefore have no way to access
refuge in the United States other than to attempt an unlawful entry,
sometimes with the aid of fraudulent documents.327
The obstacles that await refugees who reach the United States’ borders
are different, but scarcely less daunting. Asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S.
border are legally entitled to enter and receive refuge in the United States.328
In practice, however, the manner in which DHS regulates the U.S.–Mexico
border belies its ostensible aspiration to establish an orderly and humane
admissions process for refugees.
Within the past two years, DHS has established a “Remain in Mexico”
program that physically excludes asylum-seekers from U.S. territory while
they await a final adjudication of their petitions for asylum and withholding
of removal.329 Remain in Mexico has two central features. First, pursuant to
DHS’s “metering” rules, CBP officers turn back arriving asylum-seekers
before they reach the U.S. border330 to wait—for weeks, if not months—for
an interview where they can request refuge.331 Second, if asylum-seekers
327
See Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]f illegal manner of flight . . .
were enough independently to support a denial of asylum . . . virtually no persecuted refugee would obtain
asylum.”); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, at 5 (observing that “[a] refugee whose departure from his
country of origin is usually a flight, is rarely in a position to comply with the requirements for legal entry”
(quoting the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems)).
328
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (“Any alien . . . who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival . . .), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum . . . .”); id.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (providing that a foreign national “arriving in the United States” must be referred to
an asylum officer for an interview if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a
fear of persecution”).
329
See generally HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10295, THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY’S
REPORTED
“METERING”
POLICY:
LEGAL
ISSUES
(2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/LSB10295.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZJ7-DCRE] (discussing the policy).
This followed a presidential proclamation that suspended all admissions at the U.S.–Mexico border for
ninety days. See Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-addressing-mass-migrationsouthern-border-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/R7RC-XYCR] (President Trump’s Proclamation
Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States).
330
See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Partially Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint at 6–11, Al Otro Lado v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. Nov.
29, 2018) (arguing that repulsing asylum-seekers from the United States pursuant to the “Remain in
Mexico” policy is lawful because they lack constitutional and statutory rights under U.S. law as they have
not reached U.S. territory).
331
SMITH, supra note 329, at 3. To the consternation of refugee-rights activists, the Trump
Administration has authorized Border Patrol agents to conduct credible fear interviews in some locations,
sidelining asylum officers. See Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol Agents, Rather than Asylum Officers,
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successfully demonstrate a credible fear of persecution during their initial
interview, the so-called “Migration Protection Protocols” (MPP)
ordinarily332 require that they continue to wait in Mexico until the time
arrives for their appearance before an immigration judge.333 Even if
immigration judges determine that refugees qualify for asylum or
withholding of removal, DHS may still exclude them until DOJ’s Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) completes appellate review.334 All told, this
process can result in refugees being excluded from U.S. territory for years as
their immigration cases run their course.
DHS has described Remain in Mexico as a “humanitarian” solution to
an immigration crisis that has overwhelmed the federal government’s
administrative capacities.335 This characterization might be plausible if
Mexico offered refugees a true safe haven, but it does not. Mexico has not
promised MPP migrants asylum or even withholding of removal, but merely
“temporary entrance” pending the resolution of U.S. immigration
proceedings.336 Moreover, human-rights organizations have shown that
Mexico “is not a uniformly safe country for all asylum-seekers” because

Interviewing Families for “Credible Fear,” L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019, 5:50 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-19/border-patrol-interview-migrant-families-crediblefear [https://perma.cc/PB4B-TYD3].
332
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/W5M7-XGUY]
[hereinafter MPP] (explaining that the MPP does not apply, inter alia, to Mexican nationals who “more
likely than not [would] face persecution or torture in Mexico” and unaccompanied children).
333
See Nicole Acevedo, New Border Tent Courts Create a ‘Faux Process’ for Asylum-Seekers,
Attorneys Say, NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://nbcnews.com/news/latino/new-border-tentcourts-create-faux-process-asylum-seekers-attorneys-n1053196
[https://perma.cc/9FK6-SVDY]
(describing tent facilities established in Brownsville and Laredo, Texas, to handle these cases). DHS has
argued that the MPP is a valid implementation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), which authorizes the Attorney
General to return foreign nationals “arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from
a foreign territory contiguous to the United States . . . pending a [status-determination] proceeding.” MPP,
supra note 332.
334
See First Remain in Mexico Refugee Granted Asylum, Yet Government Threatens to Return Him
to Danger, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/firstremain-mexico-refugee-granted-asylum-yet-government-threatens-return-him-danger
[https://perma.cc/2HWN-6SJG] (reporting that “the first individual forced to remain in Mexico under the
[MPP had been] granted asylum” by an IJ, but was nonetheless being threatened with return to Mexico
for the duration of DHS’s appeal to the BIA).
335
MPP, supra note 332; Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Homeland Sec., to L.
Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Nielsen Memorandum],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocolspolicy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAX4-GLTK] (providing policy guidance for implementation of
the Migrant Protection Protocols).
336
Nielsen Memorandum, supra note 335, at 2 (quoting an official statement of the Government of
Mexico dated December 20, 2018).
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“Mexican immigration officials routinely deport[] asylum-seekers to
potential persecution in their countries-of-origin, in violation of Mexican and
international law.”337 Indeed, critics have speculated that the Trump
Administration has instituted the MPP to establish a process whereby
refugees are returned indirectly to their home countries. According to
Amnesty International, “senior Mexican immigration officials” have
acknowledged “that US authorities encouraged [them] to detain and check
the legal status of asylum-seekers whom CBP was forcing to wait in Mexico,
with a potential view to deporting [asylum-seekers] to their countries-oforigin.”338 Moreover, an anonymous asylum officer has objected that the
MPP “is calculated to prevent individuals from receiving any type of
protection or immigration benefits in the future” by “ensur[ing] that a high
number of applicants will” not receive notice “of changes to hearing dates
and times” and will thereby “miss their [immigration] court dates.”339 If this
allegation is accurate, it would mean that the Executive Branch has
established the MPP not for the purpose of protecting asylum-seekers and
promoting an orderly and humane screening process, but rather to achieve
attrition through enforcement340 and indirect refoulement in violation of
domestic and international law.341
These are not the only reasons for concern. Human-rights organizations
have expressed alarm that Mexico does not authorize MPP refugees to work,
study, or receive social services within its borders.342 Hence, refugees in
337

USA: “You Don’t Have Any Rights Here,” AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
research/2018/10/usa-treatment-of-asylum-seekers-southern-border/ [https://perma.cc/X4XF-PFPP].
338
Id.
339
E-mail from Asylum Officer to USCIS Mgmt. [hereinafter Asylum Officer],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-the-email-former-asylum-officer-blasts-trump-s-remainin-mexico-policy/bd0e07ea-2b91-4d5b-9bc1-4fb01500359a/ [https://perma.cc/3LST-CBFB]. This email was sent after an August 8, 2019 meeting with management concerning the officer’s refusal to
participate in the Migration Protection Protocols (Remain in Mexico) Program. Id.
340
Id.
341
Indirect refoulement occurs when states send refugees “to countries where protection against nonrefoulement is not ensured, or to countries which may refuse entry, and which may refoule such persons
to the country where they fear persecution.” 1 UNHCR, AN OVERVIEW OF PROTECTION ISSUES IN
EUROPE: LEGISLATIVE TRENDS AND POSITIONS TAKEN BY UNHCR 96 (1995),
http://www.unhcr.org/46e65e1e2.html [https://perma.cc/C7R5-LFAA]; see also Refugee Convention,
supra note 12, art. 33 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (emphasis
added)); Asylum Officer, supra note 339 (“[T]he MPP practically ensures violation of our international
obligation of non-refoulement.”).
342
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, “WE CAN’T HELP YOU HERE”: US RETURNS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS TO
MEXICO 2 (2019), https://hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us_mexico0719_web2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3K84-CRJY]; Levi Vonk, Mexico Isn’t Helping Refugees. It’s Depriving Them of Their Rights,
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Mexico “have both immediate and long-term needs to access food, water,
shelter, communication with family and lawyers, and other necessities, but
have been left with no legal means to earn the income required to do so.”343
Although the Mexican government has established temporary shelters for
asylum-seekers, shelters in Juárez have space for fewer than 10% of those
returned to Mexico under the MPP,344 and this disparity is only increasing as
the number of MPP returnees continues to rise. In July 2019 alone, the
United States returned 11,804 migrants to Mexico under the MPP.345 By
September 2019, 66,000 returnees were in Mexico awaiting MPP hearings
or decisions in their cases.346 Meanwhile, many refugees in Mexico have been
cast adrift on the streets of notoriously dangerous cities such as Ciudad
Juárez, where they lack shelter and have become easy prey for criminal
gangs.347 The MPP program thus exposes refugees in Mexico to intolerable
conditions that violate their most basic human rights.348
Partially in recognition of these factors, the Ninth Circuit recently
upheld a preliminary injunction to set aside the MPP.349 The court concluded
that the MPP likely violates the United States’ obligation under both the INA
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 8, 2019, 10:23 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/mexico-isnt-helpingcentral-american-refugees-its-depriving-them-of-their-rights-caravan-1951-refugee-convention-nonrefoulement-honduras-central-america-turkey-syria/ [https://perma.cc/G5JF-2XU5].
343
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 342, at 18.
344
See id. at 2 (“[T]he number of asylum seekers marooned in Ciudad Juárez already outnumbered
the spaces available in free humanitarian shelters by 11 to 1.”).
345
Increasing Numbers “Remain in Mexico” Awaiting Immigration Court Hearings, TRAC
IMMIGR. (Aug. 26, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/571/ [https://perma.cc/XT9R-MB8U].
346
US Move Puts More Asylum Seekers at Risk, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 25, 2019, 12:01 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/25/us-move-puts-more-asylum-seekers-risk
[https://perma.cc/2RJU-NQMU].
347
See Debbie Nathan, Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” Policy Exposes Migrants to Rape,
Kidnapping, and Murder in Dangerous Border Cities, INTERCEPT (July 14, 2019, 6:30 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/07/14/trump-remain-in-mexico-policy/
[https://perma.cc/2T2K-VK3T]
(summarizing research suggesting that because Central Americans repulsed to Mexico “are transient,
poor, and without local ties . . . [t]hey are at severe risk of being robbed, kidnapped for ransom, beaten,
raped, [or] murdered” and offering examples); Andrea Pitzer, Trump’s ‘Migrant Protection Protocols’
Hurt the People They’re Supposed to Help, WASH. POST (July 18, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/18/trumps-migrant-protection-protocols-hurtpeople-theyre-supposed-help/?utm_term=.946a663b5a88 (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“Without money or
work permits, [MPP] migrants end up sleeping in abandoned housing or outside, at risk of rape,
kidnapping, robbery and murder.”).
348
See Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, No.
58 (XL), U.N. Doc. A/44/12/Add.1 (Oct. 13, 1989) (concluding that asylum-seekers may be returned to
transit countries only if they are “treated in accordance with recognized basic human standards until a
durable solution is found for them”).
349
See Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020).
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and the Refugee Protocol to refrain from refoulement, because the MPP calls
for Central American refugees to be driven back to Mexico where they face
violence and other persecution on account of their non-Mexican
nationality.350 In particular, the court upheld the district court’s findings that
Central American refugees in Mexico were subject to “targeted
discrimination, physical violence, sexual assault, overwhelmed and corrupt
law enforcement, lack of food and shelter, and practical obstacles to
participation in court proceedings in the United States.”351 The court
therefore held that DHS must suspend the MPP and allow asylum-seekers to
receive safe haven within the United States while their applications for relief
are pending. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court agreed to stay the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, allowing the MPP to remain in force while DHS
pursues Supreme Court review.352
Given the persecution that Central American refugees have endured in
Mexico under the Remain in Mexico policy, is it any wonder that many have
chosen to bypass the MPP, risking life and limb to enter the United States
unlawfully?353 Can they reasonably be blamed for violating U.S. immigration
controls when this course of action is necessary to address their well-founded
fear of persecution? If the answer to these questions is “no,” then prosecuting
refugees for such acts is morally indefensible.
Even if DHS eventually rolls back the Remain in Mexico policy, giving
refugees unfettered access to relief at ports of entry, DOJ’s zero-tolerance
policy would still be immoral as applied to refugees. As the Ninth Circuit
has noted, “refugees fleeing imminent persecution do not have the luxury of
choosing their escape route into the United States.”354 Without visas, most
refugees overseas have no lawful pathway to access official ports of entry by
air or sea. Many rely on smugglers to facilitate their flight to freedom and
therefore are not in a position to dictate precisely where they will enter U.S.
territory.355 When refugees finally arrive at a U.S. border, they often lack the

350

Id. at 1087–93.
Id. at 1078.
352
See Wolf v. Innovation L. Lab., 140 S. Ct. 1564 (mem.) (2020).
353
See Missing Migrants: Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION,
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/americas?region=1422
[https://perma.cc/5KBV-9RSE]
(providing estimates of the number of deaths resulting from illegal crossings of the U.S.–Mexico border,
which were higher in 2019 than in the five years preceding).
354
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1259 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 125 CONG.
REC. 35,813–14 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman)).
355
See James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1, 6 (2008) (observing that cracking down on human smuggling is problematic, from a human-rights
perspective, because “refugees must routinely rely upon smugglers and even traffickers in order to escape
351
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financial resources and knowledge of local geography necessary to reach a
distant port of entry.356 Indeed, the more vulnerable a refugee’s position, the
less likely it is that she will be able to travel to a designated port of entry
from her first point of contact with a U.S. border.357 Accordingly, the idea
that refugees are morally culpable for failing to pursue relief at an official
port of entry is based on assumptions about refugee mobility that are at odds
with most refugees’ extreme vulnerability and highly constrained choices in
the real world.
Taking a different tack, the federal government has argued that
prosecuting refugees is morally justified if refugees fail to avail themselves
of opportunities to seek asylum in third countries through which they passed
en route to the United States.358 This argument rests on the dubious premise
that refugees can find safe haven elsewhere. There are good reasons to doubt
that this premise is accurate for many refugees, including those from Central
America. The three Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras—have not established “full and fair” procedures for
adjudicating asylum claims and have not allocated the resources necessary
to protect refugees’ human rights.359 Mexico likewise has a woefully
their own country because no state grants refugees legal authorization to travel for the purpose of seeking
asylum”).
356
See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 950 F.3d at 1276 (“Many migrants enter between ports of entry
out of necessity: they ‘cannot satisfy regular exit and entry requirements and have no choice but to cross
into a safe country irregularly prior to making an asylum claim.’” (quoting Brief for UNHCR as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 15, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 950 F.3d 1242 (No. 18-17274),
ECF No. 34)).
357
See id. at 1274 (“The most vulnerable refugees are perhaps those fleeing across the border through
the point physically closest to them.”).
358
In July 2019, Attorney General William Barr issued an interim final rule disqualifying refugees
who cross the U.S. border from receiving asylum (but not withholding of removal) if they failed to apply
for protection in third countries through which they passed en route to the United States. See Asylum
Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (proposed July 16, 2019) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1208). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
preliminary injunction to prevent DHS from enforcing the rule, but the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the
district court’s order pending appellate review. See Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3, 3
(mem.) (2019).
359
See Nicole Narea, Trump’s Agreements in Central America Are Dismantling the Asylum System
as We Know It, VOX (Nov. 20, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/
9/26/20870768/trump-agreement-honduras-guatemala-el-salvador-explained
[https://perma.cc/2D49DVHB] (observing that “Northern Triangle countries lack anything resembling a legitimate asylum
system”); id. (quoting Professor Karen Musalo’s observation: “It’s like saying, ‘Your house was just
destroyed by an earthquake but there’s a house down the street that is on fire. Why don’t you seek refuge
there?”). Recently, the Trump Administration has struck deals with the three Northern Triangle countries
to allow the United States to redirect refugees to those countries. See, e.g., John Washington, Sweeping
Language in Asylum Agreement Foists U.S. Responsibilities onto El Salvador, INTERCEPT (Sept. 23,
2019, 8:58 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/09/23/el-salvador-asylum-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/
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inadequate system for handling asylum petitions and has become notorious
for returning asylum-seekers to their home countries in violation of
international law.360 Accordingly, the Trump Administration’s suggestion
that it can morally punish refugees who do not pursue relief in these countries
betrays either its ignorance of actual Northern Triangle state practices, or its
indifference to the dangers that drive many Central American refugees to
undertake their perilous passage to the United States.
In sum, refugees often have compelling moral justifications for illegally
entering or reentering the United States. As long as refugees have not
received an offer of firm resettlement elsewhere,361 the United States cannot
ethically prosecute them for sidestepping domestic border controls in pursuit
of refuge.362
2. Excuses
Refugees may also have powerful excuses for violating domestic
immigration controls. Unlike justifications, which address the morality of
particular acts, excuses “focus on the actor” herself; “they exculpate even
though the actor’s conduct may have harmed society because the actor, for
whatever reason, is not judged to be blameworthy.”363 Acts that are not
objectively justified may nonetheless be exculpated if, for example, the actor

DGF9-XCFH]. Implementing these agreements would be illegal, in my view, because the lack of “full
and fair” asylum processes in the receiving states would threaten refugees with refoulement in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
360
See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 953–56 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(summarizing reports from UNHCR, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights First, and other
organizations documenting how Mexico lacks credible procedures for conferring durable protection to
refugees); AMNESTY INT’L, OVERLOOKED, UNDER-PROTECTED: MEXICO’S DEADLY REFOULEMENT OF
CENTRAL AMERICANS SEEKING ASYLUM 5 (2018), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/AMR4176022018-ENGLISH-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AMQ7-DCGD]
(documenting
widespread violations of the principle of nonrefoulement by Mexican authorities).
361
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (providing that an alien is statutorily barred from asylum if she
was “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States”).
362
DHS regulations codify this principle by stating that an alien will not be considered “firmly
resettled” unless she “entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15
(2006). Even if such an offer has been extended, a refugee will not be considered “firmly resettled” if her
“entry into [a transit] country was a necessary consequence of [her] flight from persecution,” she
“remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and [she] did not
establish significant ties in that country,” or if her conditions of residence were “substantially and
consciously restricted” by the transit country. Id.
363
Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They
Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 726 (2004).
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acted involuntarily due to external coercion, cognitive incapacity, or other
mitigating circumstances.364
Moral philosophers generally agree that criminal acts should be excused
if an actor reasonably believed that the acts were necessary for her own selfpreservation.365 For retributivists, self-preservation excuses criminal acts
because no one could be blamed for refusing to sacrifice her own life or basic
liberties for the sake of compliance with the law.366 Utilitarians, in turn,
accept excuses as exculpating reasons for potentially criminal action because
the criminal law cannot serve as an effective deterrent when an actor’s own
life or basic freedoms are on the line.367 Both schools should therefore be
prepared to accept that when a refugee faces a credible threat of persecution
abroad, her well-founded fear may excuse an irregular border crossing that
is necessary to facilitate her flight to freedom.
Fear of future persecution is not the only subjective factor that may
excuse violations of domestic immigration law. Habituated distrust of public
officials may cause refugees to distrust law enforcement officials
elsewhere—including in third countries where they seek protection.368
Federal courts have also recognized that because refugees frequently
“receive misinformation, from smugglers and others, about the appropriate
way to seek refuge in this country,” they are often “unaware that [they] could
safely enter legally.”369 In such cases, criminal “prosecution penalizes [them]
for [their] ignorance, in contradiction of our government’s policy of
providing safe haven to refugees fleeing political violence and

364

See FLETCHER, supra note 311, at 803 (observing that criminal acts may be excused by “moral or
normative involuntariness” or “physical involuntariness”); Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 938 (observing
that criminal law excuses for “involuntary” acts cover not only acts that are “not deliberate,” but also
those performed “under constraint or duress”).
365
See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION ch. XIII, § 1, III (London, W. Pickering 1823) (concluding that “punishment ought not to
be inflicted” where it would be “inefficacious” because it would not deter “mischief”); THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 208 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651) (“If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled
to do[] a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his
own preservation.”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 36 (J. Ladd trans.,
2d ed. 1999) (1797) (arguing that that crimes committed for self-preservation qualify for a “subjective
exemption from punishment” (i.e., excuse), not an “objective legality” (i.e., justification)).
366
See, e.g., KANT, supra note 365, at 36.
367
See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 365, ch. VIII, § 1, III.
368
See United States v. Malenge, 294 F. App’x 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasizing “that some
refugees, particularly those fleeing political violence, harbor a natural distrust of government officials”).
To be sure, some refugees seek entry into the United States precisely because they do trust the U.S.
government to protect their human rights. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they trust U.S.
border agents to assist their flight from persecution.
369
Id. at 644–45.
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persecution.”370 Combine these factors with the extreme emotional distress
that many refugees experience due to past trauma,371 and it becomes
increasingly difficult to imagine how a zero-tolerance policy for immigration
crimes could be applied ethically to all refugees, as there are clear excuses
for their potentially criminal behavior.
C. Refugee Prosecution and the Rule of Law
Thus far, this Part has identified moral considerations that weigh against
prosecuting refugees based on the justifiability of particular acts or
considerations that excuse specific actors. A third factor weighing against
refugee prosecution is the moral responsibility that public authorities bear to
respect people subject to their jurisdiction as rational, self-determining
agents. When well-founded fears of persecution drive refugees to violate
U.S. border controls in search of safety, prosecuting them for such acts may
be inconsistent with the United States’ moral obligation to respect the rule
of law.
Skeptics might object that I have it exactly backwards. Doesn’t fidelity
to the rule of law oblige public authorities to enforce the law’s
proscriptions—even against refugees? Wouldn’t a state undermine the rule
of law if it declined to punish refugees for unlawful entry? Not necessarily.
To understand why this is so, it may be helpful to reflect briefly on why at
least some legal philosophers have understood the rule of law to be morally
consequential.
The rule of law draws attention to the manner in which public
authorities exercise power over people subject to their jurisdiction. Many
legal theorists resist the idea that the rule of law has a moral dimension.372
An influential strand in rule-of-law discourse, however, is Lon Fuller’s
370
Id. at 644. Although “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law . . . is no defense to criminal
prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system,” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199
(1991), moral philosophers do not uniformly endorse this maxim as an accurate assessment of moral
responsibility. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, IGNORANCE OF LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 1–2 (2016)
(arguing that when criminal laws do not target acts malum in se, ignorance of the law is a valid moral
excuse and should be a complete excuse from criminal liability). Moreover, whatever force the maxim
might have in other settings, it is less defensible as applied to refugees, who are often compelled to flee
their home countries without advance warning and therefore typically lack the opportunity to become
acquainted with U.S. criminal and immigration law before they reach a U.S. border.
371
See UNHCR, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RECEPTION
AND INTEGRATION 233 (2002), http://www.refworld.org/docid/405189284.html [https://perma.cc/68EBHSQR] (citing clinical studies, which suggest that “rates of post traumatic stress disorder [among
refugees] rang[e] from between 39% and 100% (compared with 1% in the general population)” (citations
omitted)).
372
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 210, 224–25 (2d ed. 1979).
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insight that legal directives must satisfy certain formal criteria to fulfill a
state’s moral obligation to respect people as rational, self-determining
agents.373 For example, legal directives must express general, not ad hoc,
commands; must not be contradictory; and must not “require conduct beyond
the powers of the affected party.”374 A directive that does not satisfy these
desiderata would not comport with the rule of law because it would not
afford a rational basis for people to orient their behavior in response to it.375
As Fuller explains,
[T]here can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral
obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or
that came into existence only after he had acted, or was unintelligible, or was
contradicted by another rule of the same system, or commanded the impossible,
or changed every minute.376

When a legal directive does not appeal to a party’s reason, Fuller suggests,
the “bond of reciprocity” between the state and its people is “completely
ruptured,” negating “the citizen’s duty to observe the rules.”377
Fuller’s conception of the rule of law suggests that states cannot morally
prosecute refugees who violate domestic immigration controls in pursuit of
safety from persecution. As states recognized during negotiations over the
Refugee Convention, threatening a refugee with prosecution for illegal entry
essentially entraps him “between two sovereign orders, one ordering him to
leave the country [or face persecution] and the other forbidding his entry
[under pain of criminal sanctions].”378 The refugee in this setting faces
contradictory commands from multiple sovereigns; irrespective of which
command he obeys, he will be consigned to “lead[] the life of an outlaw.”379
With no legal option for safe residence, his very existence becomes an
373
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39–40 (rev. ed. 1969). Although not all scholars
endorse Fuller’s account of the rule of law as a moral ideal, Fuller’s formal criteria have been cited by
scholars of diverse theoretical orientations as an appropriate starting point for inquiry into the rule of law.
See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 61–89
(2001); ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 6–10 (2007); N.E. SIMMONDS, LAW AS A
MORAL IDEA 64–68 (2007); Evan Fox-Decent, Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?,
27 LAW & PHIL. 533, 535–37 (2008); Matthew H. Kramer, On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law,
63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 65, 65 (2004).
374
FULLER, supra note 373, at 39.
375
Id.
376
Id. For further discussion of Fuller’s reciprocity-based conception of the rule of law, see P AUL
GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 74–77 (2016), and KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS
LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L. FULLER 97–101 (2012).
377
FULLER, supra note 373, at 40.
378
WEIS, supra note 83, at 202.
379
Id.
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illegality.380 “In this way,” domestic criminal prohibitions that are “intended
to protect law and order” actually “achieve the opposite result”—subverting
the rule of law within a global context “when an attempt is made to apply
them to refugees without taking into account [refugees’] peculiar
position.”381
A more substantively robust conception of the rule of law offers
additional reasons to reject refugee prosecution.382 Some sovereign
commands fail to respect human rationality and agency, not because they are
formally contradictory or demand the impossible, but because they call for
individuals to perform acts that no rational person could be expected to
perform. To be sure, a state can reasonably demand that individuals act
against their own immediate interests in a variety of circumstances. As Scott
Shapiro has observed, obedience to inconvenient laws can be understood as
“the moral price that parties must pay in order to secure the compliance of
others.”383 Accordingly, a rational person could choose to submit to an
authority who acts against her interests in some settings to secure reciprocal
compliance from the state and other people for other aspects of the law’s
grand bargain. But there are some acts that a state may never demand of its
people because no rational person would accept such directives as part of a
grand bargain. In particular, no rational person would voluntarily submit to
a legal system that calls for or allows her own extrajudicial killing, torture,
or prolonged arbitrary detention. Domestic laws that countenance such
measures are anathema to a substantively robust account of the rule of law
because they treat people as mere objects of state power, rather than as
purposeful, self-determining agents who are entitled to secure and equal
freedom.384 By the same reasoning, a state that uses criminal sanctions to
380
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 238, at 298 & n.48 (“If . . . you cannot safely return [to your home state]
because its rulers are making war on their own people . . . , the right of any other state to exclude you
runs up against its own internal limit.”); Mattias Kumm, Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan State
16–17 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 13-68, 2013) (“In order to justify
excluding someone from a state that person must have access to some other state that does not violate his
or her rights.”).
381
WEIS, supra note 83, at 202.
382
See Fox-Decent, supra note 373, at 535, 538–39 (arguing that respect for human rights is an
essential component of the rule of law).
383
See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 433 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
384
See Fox-Decent, supra note 373, at 576–78. Significantly, international law characterizes the
prohibitions on extrajudicial killing, torture, slavery, and prolonged arbitrary detention as “peremptory
norms” (jus cogens) that states may never violate under any circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELS. OF THE U.S. § 702 cmts. d–i, § 102 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1987). In previous writings,
Evan Fox-Decent and I have explained how these norms are integral to a substantively robust conception
of the rule of law. See, e.g., Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Internal Morality of International
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deter refugees from accessing protection, or to punish those who do, assumes
an attitude of hostility or indifference toward refugees that is incompatible
with the rule of law. Therefore, there can be no rational ground for asserting
that people have a moral obligation to obey laws that prohibit crossing
borders when such acts are necessary to escape persecution.
Considered alongside refugees’ powerful justifications and excuses for
entering the United States outside an authorized port of entry, these rule of
law concerns help to explain why the United States has joined with other
states to outlaw refugee prosecution in the Refugee Protocol. They also
clarify why Congress has refrained from penalizing refugees for illegal entry
and reentry in the INA, and they strengthen the case for concluding that
prosecuting refugees constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
D. Reviving Necessity and Duress
Although federal courts have been slow to recognize the moral stakes
of refugee prosecution, the same ethical considerations that support
exempting refugees from criminal liability under the Refugee Protocol and
the INA also arguably support allowing refugees to raise successful necessity
and duress defenses. Under the common law, necessity and duress eliminate
criminal liability in settings where a defendant lacks moral culpability for
otherwise criminal acts. Necessity applies when a defendant’s acts are
morally justified,385 while duress excuses criminal conduct when a defendant
lacked sufficient voluntariness to incur moral culpability.386 As safeguards
against unwarranted punishment, these defenses also contribute to ensuring
that criminal penalties are compatible with a morally robust conception of
the rule of law. Although some legal and ethical aspects of necessity and
duress defenses remain controversial, the better view is that federal courts
should allow refugees to use these defenses in many cases to escape criminal
liability for illegal entry and reentry.387
Law, 63 MCGILL L.J. 765, 767–68 (2018); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 332–33 (2009).
385
See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that necessity
“justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to
be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the
crime”).
386
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (AM. L. INST. 2019) (providing that duress applies if an “actor
engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist”).
387
The Supreme Court has recognized that traditional common law defenses are available under
federal criminal law unless precluded by statute. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006)
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A classic scenario where necessity and duress defenses apply is a prison
fire. Although escaping from prison is a crime, the Supreme Court has
explained that a prisoner can avoid liability for this crime “when the prison
is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be
burnt.’”388 In the prison fire scenario, an otherwise criminal act is morally
justified under the circumstances to the extent that it is necessary to preserve
the inmate’s life (i.e., necessity). Moreover, even if breaking prison were not
objectively justified, the inmate’s reasonable perception of the gravity of the
threat may excuse her failure to comply with the law (i.e., duress).389
By the same logic, refugees should be able to assert successful necessity
and duress defenses to prosecution for illegal entry and reentry. Threatening
a refugee with prosecution for an unauthorized border crossing is akin to
forcing a prisoner to choose between burning or hanging. The refugee
similarly must choose between two evils: either endure persecution in her
home country or be branded a criminal if she bypasses U.S. border controls
in pursuit of asylum. Given this choice, a refugee’s decision to escape
persecution in her home country (the greater evil) may justify and excuse her
transgression of U.S. border controls (the lesser evil).
Notably, in the dozens of reported cases where refugees have asserted
necessity and duress defenses to prosecution for illegal entry and reentry, no
court has ever held that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 foreclose these defenses.
Instead, courts have tended to reject these defenses on a case-by-case basis
because refugees could not satisfy two requirements: (1) a threat of imminent
harm, and (2) exhaustion of alternative remedies.390
(establishing the federal evidentiary burden for a duress defense); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
410, 415 n.11 (1980) (“We . . . recognize that Congress in enacting criminal statutes legislates against a
background of Anglo-Saxon common law . . . .”). To date, however, the Court has not had occasion to
decide definitively whether refugees may rely on necessity or duress as a defense to prosecution for illegal
entry or reentry. See generally United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490
(2001) (“[I]t is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity
defense not provided by statute.”). For purposes of this discussion, I assume that necessity is available as
a defense to illegal entry and reentry charges because Congress has not indicated to the contrary in the
INA’s text or legislative history.
388
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868) (quoting EDMUND PLOWDEN, ON
1 EDWARD I (1307)); see also Bailey, 444 US at 415 (quoting this passage from Kirby with approval);
Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 226 (1921) (same).
389
See People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974) (endorsing these principles).
390
See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla-Siciliano, 643 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that
the defendant could not establish a necessity defense because he “failed to identify any specific threat to
his safety, and relied only on a generalized fear of harm from the government and gang members” and
“did not exclude the option of going to a country other than the United States”); United States v. Grainger,
239 F. App’x 188, 190–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a refugee who traveled through Canada could
not establish a necessity defense to illegal reentry); United States v. Fashola, No. 94-5769, 1995 WL
686329, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 1995) (rejecting a Nigerian asylum-seeker’s justification defense, in part,
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Conventional wisdom suggests that the imminence and exhaustion
requirements for necessity and duress serve a common purpose:
incentivizing people to seek assistance from public officials before they take
the law into their own hands.391 For example, if a prison inmate faces a threat
of physical abuse from other prisoners, she must ordinarily request
protection from prison officers or the courts before resorting to a prison
break. If a prisoner cannot demonstrate imminence or exhaustion of
remedies, she cannot show that public officials would have been unwilling
or unable to render timely assistance.392 Consequently, she cannot meet her
burden to prove that breaking prison was justified under the circumstances,
nor can she demonstrate that her actions were morally excused on the ground
that a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to resist the
temptation to break prison. Without a viable moral justification or excuse,
her necessity and duress defenses to criminal charges for breaking prison
would likewise fail.393
In the past, federal courts have concluded that refugees cannot satisfy
the imminence requirement without showing that they faced an immediate
threat of persecution at the very moment when they crossed into the United
States.394 Although this approach lies well within the mainstream of federal

because the defendant “has not presented any evidence . . . as to why he could not have fled to another
country”); United States v. Brizuela, No. B–13–CR–476–1, 2014 WL 2257405, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 29,
2014) (concluding that because “a generalized fear of harm in the future is insufficient to meet the
imminent harm element” for duress, “[d]efendant’s testimony that he generally feared for his life in El
Salvador . . . is insufficient to meet the imminent harm element of duress”); United States v. Crown, No.
99 CR. 1044 (AGS), 2000 WL 709003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2000) (rejecting a necessity defense for
a defendant who reentered the United States to gain access to a life-sustaining treatment for HIV/AIDS
that was unavailable in his own country because “defendant had the option of traveling to a country other
than the United States in order to seek treatment”).
391
Cf. George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
553, 570 (1996) (“[T]he imminence requirement expresses the limits of governmental competence: when
the danger to a protected interest is imminent and unavoidable, . . . the police are no longer in a position
to intervene and exercise the state’s functioning of securing public safety.”).
392
See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410–11 (“Clearly, in the context of prison escape, the escapee is not
entitled to claim a defense of duress or necessity unless and until he demonstrates that, given the
imminence of the threat, [breaking out of prison] was his only reasonable alternative.”).
393
See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that because “the
task . . . of protecting prisoners from assaults within prisons rests [primarily] with correctional officials,”
a necessity defense applies only in the “few and very limited circumstances” when it is not “possible for
an endangered inmate to secure protection from correctional officials or from the courts”); Lovercamp,
118 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (suggesting that a defendant must show that there was “no time for a complaint to
the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints
illusory”).
394
See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Chavez, No. 13–00490 DAE, 2013 WL 3581959, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. July 2, 2013) (rejecting a defendant’s duress defense because his kidnappers near the U.S.–Mexico
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case law, it arguably cuts too narrowly. Some criminal law theorists have
argued that imminence analysis should focus not on whether harm was
imminent at the time a defendant acted, but rather whether the defendant had
an immediate need to take action in order to prevent the threatened harm.395
An otherwise unlawful act may be morally permissible, in other words, when
it is immediately necessary to avert harm, irrespective of whether the
anticipated harm is proximate in time or place.396 Consistent with this
thinking, one federal district court has held that an Ethiopian refugee who
escaped from immigration detention could assert a valid necessity or duress
defense to criminal charges based on the “ultimate harm” awaiting him
abroad, even if that harm would occur in a distant location at an unknown
future date.397 In another case, a refugee faced prosecution for assaulting
DHS officers on an airplane in order to prevent them from returning him to
Togo, where he feared persecution.398 The district court agreed that the
defendant could assert a necessity defense even if the “persecution . . . or
danger” awaiting him in Togo “was not physically present at the precise
moment” when the altercation occurred.399 Although these two decisions are
outliers in federal case law, they reflect a common moral calculus. In both
cases, the district courts reasoned that criminal violations could be morally
justified or excused—even if the threat was not physically or temporally
immediate at the time—as long as refugees needed to act swiftly to avoid a
serious risk of persecution in their countries of origin.
This approach to imminence would reframe how federal courts
approach necessity and duress defenses in the context of refugee prosecution
under §§ 1325(a) and 1326. When evaluating necessity, courts would
determine whether a refugee had to enter the United States at the time she
did to avoid a serious risk of harm in her home country or a transit country.

border “were not in hot pursuit” when he “slipped away . . . unnoticed” and “crossed the Rio Grande river
without anyone pursuing him”).
395
See, e.g., Robert F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis & Megan Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 69
(“Immediate necessity, not imminence of harm, should be considered essential to self-defense
claims . . . .”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 105,
127 (1990) (“Imminence is relevant only because it helps identify cases where flight or legal intervention
will be impossible, so that violent self-help becomes truly necessary. The decisive factor is necessity, not
imminence per se.”). But see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to
Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 247 (2004) (critiquing this approach to self-defense on the ground that the
use of force requires special justification).
396
Of course, in most self-defense cases a defendant will struggle to prove that the use of force was
strictly necessary if her assailant’s attack had yet to commence.
397
United States v. Dagnachew, 808 F. Supp. 1517, 1523 (D. Colo. 1992).
398
United States v. Kpomassie, 323 F. Supp. 2d 894, 896–97 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).
399
Id. at 901.
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If so, the anticipated harm would be sufficiently imminent, in the relevant
sense, to justify the refugee’s circumvention of U.S. border controls.
Similarly, when a refugee reasonably believes that traveling to the United
States is immediately necessary to escape persecution, this belief would be
sufficient to establish a duress defense without a refugee having to show that
her persecutors chased her all the way to the U.S. border. Under this
“immediate need” approach to imminence, many refugees would have valid
necessity and duress defenses to illegal entry and reentry charges.
The exhaustion of remedies requirement for necessity and duress
defenses should be even easier for refugees to satisfy. Keep in mind that
asylum-seekers cannot qualify as refugees in the first place without
demonstrating that public officials in their country of origin would be either
the source of their persecution or unable or unwilling to protect them from
nonstate actors.400 By definition, therefore, all refugees can show that they
have exhausted the remedies available to them in their home country.
The suggestion that a refugee cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement
without showing that no other country in the world would grant her asylum
is morally suspect. As long as a refugee has not received a firm offer of
resettlement elsewhere, faulting her for seeking protection in the United
States is like blaming a starving hiker for breaking into one unoccupied cabin
rather than another in order to obtain life-sustaining provisions. When a
starving hiker stumbles upon several cabins but has not received an invitation
to enter any of them, her otherwise unlawful act of breaking and entering
into any particular cabin may be morally justified and excused to preserve
her life. Similarly, when a refugee has the option to pursue protection in
multiple countries, her decision to enter any particular country should not be
punishable on the ground that asylum might have been available elsewhere.
As long as a refugee has not received a firm offer of resettlement abroad, the
mere hypothetical possibility that she might be able to access relief
somewhere else in the world should not prevent her from asserting successful
necessity and duress defenses in the United States. The common law’s moral
foundations thus arguably support the view that refugees have valid necessity
and duress defenses to criminal charges under §§ 1325(a) and 1326.

400
See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (holding that term “persecution” in
Refugee Act encompasses only harm inflicted “either by the government of a country or by persons or an
organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control”), overruled in part on other grounds
by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987).
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E. How Prosecution Undermines Protection
Perhaps recognizing the weight of these moral objections, defenders of
refugee prosecution sometimes advance another argument: the prejudicial
impact of this practice is limited because refugees are still free to seek asylum
and withholding of removal in immigration court.401 This argument is
unconvincing for several reasons.
First, in practice, refugees are not always free to petition for asylum and
withholding of removal after they complete their criminal sentences.402
According to one recent report, defendants near the U.S.–Mexico border who
are sentenced to time served are typically “taken straight to the bridge or
deported after court.”403 Hence, if criminal defense counsel is not “forceful”
in asserting their clients’ desire to apply for relief from removal (a matter
outside their official purview), refugees may be summarily expelled without
receiving an opportunity to communicate their fear of persecution to an
asylum officer or immigration judge.404 Further, after a refugee has been
removed from the United States, she cannot qualify for asylum following a
subsequent reentry if the government requests to have the first removal order
summarily “reinstated.”405 The Attorney General might also invoke an
asylum-seeker’s illegal entry or reentry as a factor weighing against a
favorable exercise of discretion to grant asylum.406 Cumulatively, these
401

See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (arguing that “equity
does not support” exempting a refugee from criminal liability because “criminal prosecution does not
prevent her from seeking asylum, and . . . [does not] diminish the success of an asylum application”);
INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 17 (citing CBP’s assertion that “[t]he fact that an undocumented
alien is being prosecuted does not influence the outcome of his or her credible fear claim”); cf. E. Bay
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the Attorney General may not
deny asylum based on a refugee’s unlawful entry or presence in the United States).
402
See, e.g., Arnpriester, supra note 21, at 6 (recounting the story of an Eritrean torture survivor who
entered the United States through the U.S.–Mexico border and served time for illegal entry before
receiving asylum in immigration court).
403
GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 65 (quoting immigration attorney Jodi Goodwin);
see also Kriel, supra note 117 (describing Mexican asylum-seekers who were not afforded an opportunity
to seek relief in immigration court after their prosecution for illegal entry).
404
GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 65; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note
1, at 13–14 (describing the case of two Mexican asylum-seekers who were summarily removed when
their legal counsel failed to assist them in seeking asylum and withholding of removal).
405
See Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 579–87 (4th Cir. 2017).
406
See Policy Memorandum, Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum,
and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-, PM-602-0162, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. 8 (July 11, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/
2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7T34-ML9S]
(“USCIS personnel may find an applicant’s illegal entry, including any intentional evasion of U.S.
authorities, and including any conviction for illegal entry where the alien does not demonstrate good
cause for the illegal entry, to weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.”).
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practices have transformed criminal law enforcement into a de facto
“immigration screener” that prevents refugees from accessing relief in
immigration court.407
If this were not bad enough, some U.S. Attorneys’ Offices now require
that refugees waive their statutory rights to petition for asylum and
withholding of removal as a precondition for pleading to a reduced charge
or sentence.408 Refugees in these jurisdictions therefore face a stark choice:
either they may plead guilty in exchange for time served and face
refoulement, or they may assert their statutory right to seek relief in
immigration court and receive a de facto penalty in criminal sentencing.
Neither option is consistent with the notion that criminal charges do not
prejudice a refugee’s access to relief from removal.
Second, even if refugee defendants were actually free to pursue asylum
and withholding of removal in immigration court, it would be a mistake to
overlook how criminal sentences can wreak havoc on their lives. Although
some first-time offenders are sentenced only to time served,409 others remain
behind bars for as long as six months.410 Prison terms for illegal reentry range
407

Eagly, supra note 62, at 1289. Sadly, even when asylum-seekers receive credible fear interviews,
they are sometimes removed inappropriately without being referred for a hearing in immigration court.
See ALLEN KELLER, ANDREW RASMUSSEN, KIM REEVES & BARRY ROSENFELD, STUDY ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EVALUATION OF CREDIBLE FEAR REFERRAL IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL
AT PORTS OF ENTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/
resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/evalCredibleFear.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ZV-Z9JY] (reporting
the results of a study in which observers noted that “in roughly one sixth of cases in which an alien
expressed a fear of returning to his or her native country, no referral for a Credible Fear interview was
made and the alien was either ordered removed or allowed to withdraw his or her application for entry”).
Moreover, the risk of an errant determination at the credible-fear-interview stage has become greatly
exacerbated since June 2019, when DHS authorized Border Patrol agents to conduct credible fear
interviews. Before this change, asylum officers had recommended over 90% of asylum-seekers for
hearings in immigration court; subsequently, only 10% have received such referrals, prompting lawsuits
challenging the new process. Amanda Holpuch, Asylum: 90% of Claims Fall at First Hurdle After US
Process
Change,
Lawsuit
Alleges,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
13,
2019,
2:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/13/asylum-credible-fear-interview-immigrationwomen-children-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/8C7A-E2LE]. After a refugee has been removed from the
country once, a subsequent illegal entry will render her ineligible for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)
(“If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been
removed . . . the prior order of removal is reinstated . . . [and] the alien is not eligible and may not apply
for [asylum] . . . .” (emphasis added)); Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed.
Reg. 8478, 8485 (Feb. 19, 1999) (clarifying that aliens subject to reinstated removal orders are “ineligible
for asylum”).
408
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 3 (documenting a case in which the “DOJ told [an
asylum-seeker’s] lawyers it would increase the recommended criminal sentence if he refused to waive
his right to seek asylum”); id. at 20 (observing that some federal prosecutors refused to strike plea deals
with defendants who insisted upon retaining their rights to seek asylum and withholding of removal).
409
See id. at 19.
410
Keller, supra note 110, at 131–32.
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from six months (the federal advisory guideline) to twenty years (the
statutory maximum).411 Consequently, refugees who are prosecuted for
illegal entry or reentry may languish in prison for a lengthy period.412
Third, the collateral consequences of criminal convictions can be
calamitous for refugees. Adult defendants in criminal custody are routinely
separated from their accompanying children. Detained children, in turn, have
suffered serious emotional and physical distress while in immigration
detention.413 Criminal convictions also remain on refugees’ permanent
criminal records, potentially impacting their ability to secure gainful
employment for decades to come.414
Thus, criminal charges can have a variety of devastating consequences
for refugees. Some never receive a fair opportunity to petition for asylum
and withholding of removal, while others face family separation, diminished
employment prospects, and other collateral consequences on top of their
prison term and fines. Cumulatively, these factors lend powerful support for
the conclusion that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry is
morally indefensible.
CONCLUSION
The opening scene of this Article describes how a magistrate judge
sought to console several grief-stricken asylum-seekers by acknowledging
that “none of [them] are criminals.”415 Little did he know how right he was.
As this Article shows, refugees are not criminally liable for illegal entry or
reentry. Since Congress adopted the Refugee Act in 1980, it has taken care
to distinguish ordinary migrants from refugees. This distinction reflects
411

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
One study determined that the average sentence for illegal reentry was twenty-one months. See
Keller, supra note 110, at 132. However, sentences as long as five years are apparently not uncommon.
See GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 45.
413
See Examining the Failures of the Trump Administration’s Inhumane Family Separation Policy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th
Cong. (2019) (statement of Cristina Muniz de la Pena, Terra Firma Mental Health Director, on behalf of
the American Psychological Association), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.
energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Muniz%20Testimony%20FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E2HM-TDTT] (explaining how family separation causes psychological trauma); U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE
TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES (June 3, 2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HWS3-4TPT]
(documenting
inadequate care at immigration detention facilities).
414
See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 299–300 (2011) (identifying “a multitude of statutory and
regulatory bars to employment at the local, state, and federal levels for convicted persons” and noting
that “many employers . . . use the information to avoid hiring anyone with any type of record”).
415
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9.
412
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Congress’s recognition that the United States bears special moral and
international legal obligations to refrain from penalizing refugees for
irregular migration. Although §§ 1325(a) and 1326 of the INA do not
articulate this distinction between refugees and ordinary migrants expressly,
the broader text, context, and history of the INA reveals that Congress did
not contemplate—and would not have approved—courts using these
provisions to punish refugees for acts associated with their flight from
persecution. Moreover, traditional canons of federal statutory
interpretation—including the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on
constitutional avoidance, and the rule of lenity—counsel that these sections
should be interpreted to spare refugees from criminal penalties. In the final
analysis, therefore, the observation that refugees are not “criminals” is
accurate not only in a moral sense, but also strictly as a matter of U.S. law.
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